

Gradualism in Aid and Reforms*

Parimal Kanti Bag[†] Prabal Roy Chowdhury[‡]

September 15, 2016

Abstract

Dynamic strategic interaction between an international donor and a recipient government is analyzed to review the efficacy of aid conditionality for governance reforms in LDCs. It is shown that irrespective of whether the donor can fully commit to the aid program or not, for maximal improvement in governance the aid should be disbursed in increments with each subsequent tranche being conditional on prior reforms, demonstrating *aid gradualism*. While the attraction of future aid incentivizes authorities to push through reforms, these reforms in turn also make aid diversion less feasible. Further, under full commitment, the optimal aid package may involve offering scope for *interim aid diversion* to the elite for long-term improvement in governance, with such aid diversion being more likely to happen when the total aid budget is large. With only partial commitment (so that time consistency requires the donor to reconfigure aid in each round), it is shown that (a) interim aid diversion is no longer viable, and (b) both aid and reforms exhibit *strong gradualism*, or what is known as the *starting small and grow later* principle in commitment models.

JEL Classification: H8, O2.

Key Words: Reforms, budget support, political elites, aid diversion, transparency, governance, time consistency, commitment, gradualism, start small grow later (SSGL) principle.

***Acknowledgements:** We thank two anonymous referees for many thoughtful suggestions on earlier versions of this manuscript, and Co-Editor Giovanni Maggi for helpful guidance. Dheeraj Chawdhary, Neng Qian and Sayoudh Roy provided valuable research assistance. Support received from the Singapore Ministry of Education Academic Research Fund, Tier 1 (grant no. R-122-000-151-112) and the PPRU, Indian Statistical Institute, are gratefully acknowledged. Any mistakes are ours.

[†]Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, AS2 Level 6, 1 Arts Link, Singapore 117570; E-mail: ecsbpc@nus.edu.sg

[‡]Economics and Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India; E-mail: prabalrc@isid.ac.in

1 Introduction

The doctrine of ‘aid conditionality’ constitutes a well-known theme in the economics of international relations. Our objective is to review the usefulness of aid conditionality in ensuring governance reforms in less developed countries. To that end we develop a theory of how conditional aid should be structured in a dynamic model of strategic interaction between an international donor and a recipient government. Inter alia, we examine if long-term improvements in governance can entail tolerating some aid diversion in the short run.

The notion of governance is of course multi-faceted. It refers to not just institutional aspects like the rule of law (and its implementation), transparency and freedom of the press, but also to economic ones such as opening up of markets to competition, both external and domestic. Good governance not only protects the basic rights of citizens and institutions, it also ensures that the higher echelons of government and the elite cannot misuse their political power for either unfair advantage or extortion. It is therefore not too implausible to attribute a broad range of governance reform objectives to international donors, be it the World Bank, the IMF, or developed countries.

Based on policies adopted by aid agencies as well as individual governments, a large empirical literature has developed on the subject of what contributes to the success or failure of aid initiatives. For instance, using data for 56 developing countries over 1970–1993, [Burnside and Dollar \(2000\)](#) have argued that “aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies.”¹ Despite some arguments to the contrary, the connection between the quality of the recipient’s domestic policies/governance and aid effectiveness appears to be reasonably well accepted now.²

Following on, policy recommendations with regard to aid take two different approaches. One school advocates *conditionality*³ – giving aid in tranches, with the release of later tranches

¹The results are robust to alternative specifications such as inclusion or exclusion of middle income countries, adjusting for outliers, whether policies as assumed to be exogenous or endogenous.

²[Easterly \(2003\)](#) and [Easterly et al. \(2004\)](#), who use the same specifications but incorporate additional data, find that this linkage might not be significant. However, [Burnside and Dollar \(2004\)](#) uses a new data set focusing only on the 1990s to argue that the results noted in [Burnside and Dollar \(2000\)](#) do go through. [Svensson \(1999\)](#) also argues that aid impacts positively on growth in countries with with better democracy.

³[Mosley \(1992\)](#) (p. 129) observes that there is extensive use of aid conditionality by international financial institutions (IFIs) since the establishment of the new international order at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944. Among the IFIs, the World Bank, as well as the IMF often demanded a long list of reforms in governance in return for aid. [Kapur and Webb \(2000\)](#), [Santiso \(2001a\)](#), and [Santiso \(2001b\)](#) document World Bank conditionality, whereas [Guitian \(1995\)](#) documents the use of conditionality in the IMF. See also [Koeberle \(2003\)](#), and an [OED \(2004\)](#) report. Conditionality also relates to an important debate in the aid literature: transformation versus gradualism; see [Temple \(2010\)](#) (p. 4422).

made conditional on specific reforms.⁴ In the context of aid to sub-Saharan African countries, it has been shown that conditional aid was largely successful in implementing governance improvements, opening up to foreign competition in this case (see [Morrissey \(2004a\)](#)).⁵ The other school of thought focuses on *selectivity*, i.e. giving aid to countries that have good governance/policies to begin with. Our theoretical analysis and results fall within the first strand, but it has the potential to also contribute to the selectivity debate.⁶

Why do aid programs typically involve conditionality? While the literature has identified several problems intrinsic to non-conditional aid that may make conditionality useful,⁷ in this paper we trace the need for conditionality to the political economy of the recipient countries, in particular the fact that the interest of the elite who control the government and that of the general public need not coincide. This is in consonance with the “institutional failures” approach, first developed in the context of the African economy, e.g. [Bates \(1981\)](#), [Sandbrook \(1986\)](#), [Collier \(1990\)](#), and [Adam and O’Connell \(1999\)](#). To quote [Bates \(1983\)](#) (p. 165):

“...recent experiences in Africa and elsewhere make it clear that the preferences of governments often bear little correspondence to any idealization of the public interest. Rather, governments engage in bureaucratic accumulation and they act so as to enhance the wealth and power of those who derive their incomes from the public sector... They engage in economic redistribution, often from the poor to the rich.”

Further, as [Adam and O’Connell \(1999\)](#) argue, such institutional failures lead to economic failures, so that aid becomes a necessity.

We analyze the issue of aid conditionality in a framework where the political tension discussed above is formalized as an ex-post moral hazard problem so that a part of the aid can be diverted by the privileged class, and may not reach the intended beneficiaries.⁸ The extent of such diversion depends on the level of governance – with better governance less can

⁴[Conway \(2003\)](#) remarks: “The credit available in an IMF arrangement is disbursed in tranches. The tranches are disbursed according to a set timetable on the request of the borrowing country. Later tranches can only be disbursed if the country has met the conditions defined in the Letter of Intent associated with the arrangement.”

⁵We shall come back to this point in section 8, where we discuss some empirical studies on conditional aid and a recent case study.

⁶In a related work ([Bag and Roy Chowdhury \(2016\)](#)), we find that conditionality can be a tool for identifying which countries have better reform potential due to more effective governance, generally a precondition for selective provision of aid

⁷[Banerjee and He \(2008\)](#) suggest that given the leakages in aid due to lack of monitoring, transparency and governance, provision of aid requires careful program evaluations. [Banerjee \(2007\)](#) discusses alternative ways of enhancing the effectiveness of aid, including making governments compete for aid through transparency.

⁸Thus we follow [Boone \(1996\)](#), [McGuire and Olson \(1996\)](#), and [Adam and O’Connell \(1999\)](#) in assuming that the government is fully captive. [Drazen \(2000\)](#) calls such recipient governments ‘elitist’.

be diverted. To allow a role for conditionality, we examine a dynamic framework where the total aid amount can be disbursed in three tranches, if so desired. Thus the donor, who cares about governance, can condition the release of future tranches on governance improvement. Given that the lack of commitment could be a key reason why aid programs might fail (Kanbur (2000)), we consider two scenarios. The first scenario, where the donor can commit to the aid program from the beginning, leads to the *full conditional commitment* (or FCC) program. A second case is where the donor cannot commit fully to the aid package over the entire three periods, but instead will have to solve for a *partial conditional commitment* (or PCC) program.⁹

This paper makes two key contributions. The first is a foundational one, in that we provide a simple formalization of the idea of *aid gradualism*. Should aid be staggered at all, with future tranches being dependent on past performance? Clearly any requirement that the recipient engages in costly reforms will go unheeded if the entire aid is given up front. So disbursing the aid over two rounds, with the second round being conditional on governance improvement, certainly seems to be a better alternative. But when it comes to extending this logic to more than two rounds, the issue is less clear-cut.

One problem with extending the above logic to more than two rounds has to do with the problem of commitment. If the donor cannot fully commit to the entire aid sequence over three rounds but instead has to solve a PCC program, then whether splitting aid in the last two rounds in a time consistent manner would benefit reforms vis-à-vis splitting it over just the first two rounds is unclear: time consistency for the three-round program imposes an additional restriction on the aid mechanism. In fact, the benefit of an extra round is not clear even under FCC, even though commitment is not an issue in this case. To see why, starting from a two-period program one can construct a three-period program where some of the aid from period 1 or period 2 is shifted to the third. This is likely to reduce the governance improvement at the end of period 1 that, in turn, makes aid diversion in period 2 easier. This disincentive has to be weighed in against the prospect of positive aid at the end of period 3.

Our results are as follows. We find that irrespective of commitment abilities, the optimal aid delivery mechanism involves gradualism, conditioning the continuation of future aid upon intermediate reforms. Given gradualism, a related question is the issue of starting slow versus a big bang approach. We find that in case full commitment is not possible, aid and reforms exhibit an increasing pattern, that is, start with small improvements and push for bigger gains in the later stages, thus conforming with the insights of conditional commitment

⁹Staiger and Tabellini (1987) consider the problem of time consistency that arises with commitment in the context of trade policy.

models, e.g., [Watson \(1999\)](#), [Watson \(2002\)](#), [Klimenko et al. \(2008\)](#). At this point we should emphasize that we allow for linear costs, which ensures that the framework is not biased towards either gradualism or starting small. Thus neither of these results can be traced to purely technological reasons.

A second issue of interest is that of *interim aid diversion*, i.e. whether, at an intermediate stage, the optimal scheme should allow for aid over and above that required to cover the costs of reforms with a view to incentivizing the elite to deliver on governance. The interim aid diversion can alternatively be thought of as the “economic rent” that the donor has to concede to the elite of the recipient government purely for incentive reasons.¹⁰ Interestingly, we find that if the donor can fully commit to its aid program then (a) interim aid diversion is more likely when total aid is larger, and (b) as the volume of aid goes up, interim aid diversion increases, both absolutely and as a fraction of total aid. This result is of interest since it shows that achieving long-term goals, governance in our case, may conceivably entail loss of immediate economic benefits. As we argue in section 6 later, this result finds some resonance in [Drazen \(2000\)](#) and [Morrissey \(2004a\)](#) who argue that this is one reason why aid may appear to under-perform if judged by the yardstick of immediate economic success.

■ *Aspects of modelling strategy.* In this sub-section we discuss certain aspects of our modelling strategy. First, and coming back to an issue briefly discussed earlier, why focus on governance? The first justification of course is that “it is there”. [Temple \(2010\)](#) (p. 4464) mentions the case of the Millennium Challenge Account, launched by the US Government in 2004, linking aid to political freedoms, control of corruption, and respect for civil liberties and the rule of law.¹¹ Why are donors interested in governance though? Governance improvement can be an objective in itself, as it promotes liberal values that the donors value. Further such governance improvements have an instrumental purpose, in that reforms help in facilitating development. For example, [Kaufmann et al. \(1999\)](#) document empirical evidence of a strong causal relationship between governance and development.

Second, one key feature of the analysis is to recognize that aid plays a critical role in covering the costs of reforms, either direct or indirect. Direct costs are “... often due to administrative and capacity weakness” ([Morrissey \(1999\)](#)), whereas, as pointed out by [Bakoup \(2013\)](#), indirect costs may involve “... i) transfers either between the various socioeconomic

¹⁰The point of this alternative interpretation, which is also natural in the economic theory of incentives, is to underline the mechanism’s usefulness without passing any moral judgement on whether allowing interim aid diversion is good or bad.

¹¹[Temple \(2010\)](#) finds that the history of aid shows that governance was one of the focus in the 1990s and 2000s (see Table 1 on p. 4424). In a similar vein, [Morrissey \(2004b\)](#) argues, “Conditionality ... tend to be many and wide ranging, applying not only to most areas of economic policy but also to aspects of governance and political processes.”

categories or between the government and such socioeconomic categories; ii) government staffing expenditures; iii) tax expenditures; iv) net depreciation of non-tax revenues; v) public sector net lending; and vi) debt service variations.” Also, for reforms spanning several fiscal years, the political feasibility of the needed funds transfer could be an issue, so that budget support becomes relevant.¹² Not surprisingly, [Morrissey \(2004a\)](#) argues that “Donors can assist with technical and financial support”, while in the context of gains and losses from trade reforms, [Morrissey \(2004b\)](#) notes that reform “... is an inherently slow process, and aid can compensate for the costs.”

Third, we consider a framework where reforms as well as the related costs can be verifiably measured.¹³ [Temple \(2010\)](#) (section 9.1 on aid conditionality, p. 4469) discusses how aid can be conditioned on reform efforts that can be verified directly, or indirectly, and how reforms might improve the welfare of the poor. [Bakoup \(2013\)](#) also suggests that measurability issues are not insurmountable. He points out that in recent decades *budgetary aid* (or what is often called, *budget support*), aimed at offsetting the negative financial effects of reforms in the short to medium term, is becoming a significant component of European Union and African Development Bank (ADB) aid operations geared towards economic and structural reforms.^{14,15}

■ **Literature review.** Before proceeding to the formal model we relate our work to some of the other works in the literature. The role of gradualism has been examined in other economic applications, from dynamic prisoner’s dilemma and contribution games ([Marx and Matthews \(1998\)](#), [Lockwood and Thomas \(2002\)](#), etc.), to international trade ([Staiger \(1995\)](#), [Bond and Park \(2002\)](#), [Chisik \(2003\)](#), etc.), among others. In the context of finance, [Neher \(1999\)](#) examines a holdup problem facing a venture capitalist where future loans are given in stages based on past performance.

The paper closest to ours is [Scholl \(2009\)](#), who studies a dynamic neoclassical growth model involving self-enforcing contracts between a donor and a recipient country. The donor wants a reduction of distortionary taxes to maximize household welfare, but the government may use the tax proceeds and aid money for unproductive consumption. The donor is aware

¹²The government’s budget may start from a negative balance during initial years of reform to a positive balance in subsequent years. See the discussion in [Bakoup \(2013\)](#).

¹³[Drazen \(2000\)](#) flags observability of outcomes as a potential issue.

¹⁴The European Commission defines *budget support* as “policy dialogue, financial transfers to the national treasury account of the partner country, performance assessment and capacity building based on partnership and mutual accountability.” See [EC \(2011\)](#). (Source: [Bakoup \(2013\)](#).)

¹⁵25% of European Union’s 13 billion EURO external aid over the 2003–2009 period is budgetary aid; 31.3% of the 11.3 billion Units of Account of the operations of the ADB window and 21.8% of the 10.9 billion UC operations of the ADF windows respectively at the ADB over the period 1999–2009 (source: [Bakoup \(2013\)](#)).

of this issue, and designs the conditional aid program to stimulate the economy. Scholl (2009) however finds that conditional aid is not very cost effective as more aid must be given to less benevolent political regimes. Our paper differs in its focus on reforms (as opposed to household welfare), the dynamic structure of aid and issues of interim aid diversion.¹⁶

In a couple of influential papers, Svensson (2000a) and Svensson (2000b) examine the role of donor commitment in the presence of the Samaritan’s dilemma. Svensson (2000a) suggests that the delegation of aid disbursement to agencies with less aversion to poverty can, by mitigating the Samaritan’s dilemma, lead to better enforcement of aid conditionality and improve the welfare of the poor.¹⁷ Svensson (2000b) argues that by lowering the cost of deviating from the optimal path, aid may incentivize the recipient to deviate, anticipating that bad behavior will not be punished.^{18,19,20}

We start with the basic framework in the next section. In section 3 we analyze the simpler two-period problem. Then in section 4 we present the three-period problem, with the analysis and formal results followed up in sections 5–7. In section 8 we discuss the empirical relevance, and conclude in section 9. Important proofs are included in Appendix A, while proofs of several lemmas, Proposition 4 and Mathematica simulations on interim aid diversion appear in a separate supplementary materials file.

2 Basic framework

The framework comprises a donor who has an aid budget \mathcal{A} earmarked for a specific LDC. The purpose of this aid is to incentivize some target level of reform, aimed at improving governance in the LDC. Such an objective reflects a belief on the part of the donor that the lack of development in the LDC can essentially be attributed to a lack of governance – transparency, right institutions, efficient administration, among others. Further, it reflects a belief that any reforms in governance (democracy, increased transparency, opening up markets) are relatively hard to reverse, the reason being that once a reform takes place it creates its own constituency, people who are beneficiaries of such reform and would consequently

¹⁶Two other papers using a repeated agency framework are Cordella et al. (2003) and Kletzer (2005), where the first authors focus on the connection between imperfectly enforceable conditional aid and policy outcomes, while the latter stresses the credibility of aid sanctions.

¹⁷Federico (2004) studied a similar problem of time consistency due to the Samaritan’s dilemma but in the context of policy (i.e., reform) conditionality of aid.

¹⁸Further, donor officials may have an incentive to carry through with the disbursement, once it is approved (see Mosley et al. (1995), Svensson (1998)).

¹⁹Another focus in the literature is on how optimal aid responds to various information asymmetries, e.g., tying of aid to demilitarisation given private types of donors and receivers (Murshed and Sen (1995)), and aid recipient’s preference for poverty reduction (Azam and Laffont (2003)).

²⁰Mosley (1992) examines conditionality in the context of loans.

oppose any rollback. This is the other side of the observation that reforms in governance are hard to implement (Morrissey (2004b) notes that reform “... is an inherently slow process”), precisely because the existing elite may have an interest in perpetuating the status quo.

We assume that the magnitude of \mathcal{A} has been already determined by internal considerations in the donor organization, and is thus exogenous to our problem.²¹ Once the magnitude of aid is decided, the donor simply wants to maximize its objective by disbursing the available budget. We assume that the donor can credibly commit to cancelling the aid program in case some of the aid conditionalities are not being adhered to.²² Further, the aid is of general nature in that it is not tied to any specific project, and it is up to the recipient country as to how it spends the grant.

The LDC is governed by an elite class who determine whether some key reforms should take place or not. One can think of the elite class as comprising of, among others, key political decision makers. The objective of the elite is to maximize *aid diversion*, i.e. the amount of aid money that it can appropriate. Thus in any period t , in case a surplus fund of S is available, the elite can appropriate a fraction $\alpha(g_t)$ of this fund, where g_t denotes the level of governance in the LDC at period t . The fraction of S remaining after elite appropriation, $(1 - \alpha(g_t))$, is used for consumption by the poor (hospitals, schools, food and shelter to the flood affected victims, and the likes), which we call *developmental benefits*. Ascribing such uncharitable motives to the elite may not be too far from reality as evidenced by the experience of aid agencies dealing with LDCs.

The level of governance may be thought of as simply the inverse of some aggregative corruption index. Governance may be improved by passing better laws (including, in some instances, simplification in tax rules), tightening enforcement, bringing in more transparency, improving the freedom of the press, opening up the economy to competition, both domestic as well as foreign, etc. All of these ensure, directly or indirectly, that the public duties carried out by the government will be more efficient and less prone to corruption and undue influence. This also means that any development initiative undertaken with the help of international aid money will be less likely to be diverted. In the context of *MCC* (Millennium Challenge Corporation) aid, which is an USA initiative, one finds that countries are tracked on “control of corruption” and “democratic rights”.²³

²¹The donor might be a rich country or an organization with international influence such as the World Bank, the IMF, the United Nations, or even a charity. Aid budget may be determined for a region first, then broken down for specific countries.

²²We do not model credible commitment – an explicit modelling would require multiple recipients. See, for instance, Svensson (2003).

²³In the Concluding section, we provide a sample tracking document for Indonesia. Similar documents can be found for several other recipients; see <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work>.

Improving the level of governance from \mathbf{g} to \mathbf{g}' involves a cost of $C(\mathbf{g}' - \mathbf{g})$. While this cost can be interpreted as a purely technological one, arising out of the need to upgrade facilities and services (such as more record keeping of accounts, complaints, procedural scrutiny, committee works, etc.), we interpret it more broadly. In particular, this cost can be attributed to the necessary compensatory measures, including direct transfers, that the incumbent government must make to those who lose out from reforms (see [Temple \(2010\)](#), paragraph 2, section 9.1 on ‘Policy conditionality’, p. 4429). Replacing labor-intensive bureaucracy by machines would incur direct costs and sometimes indirect costs due to resistance from trade unions; filling up vacant posts for judges for better law enforcement is costly; and so on. These reforms must come at the expense of the government’s alternative expenditure plans, or financed out of aid money. We will assume that the country in question is cash strapped, so that reforms become easier with external help.

We shall maintain the following assumptions regarding $\alpha(\mathbf{g})$ and $C(\cdot)$:

- Assumption 1.** (i) $\alpha(\mathbf{g})$ is strictly decreasing, and twice differentiable in \mathbf{g} .
(ii) $C(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing, weakly convex and twice differentiable, with $C(0) = 0$.

We shall consider a framework where the total aid, i.e. \mathcal{A} , is time-bound and to be spent over a given calendar time, normalized to 1. The donor’s problem is to decide whether to distribute this given amount in two tranches, or three, all equally spaced.

3 Two-period horizon

In this section we analyze the optimal aid design when the donor decides to disburse the total amount \mathcal{A} in two tranches. Let the discount factor applicable to the two-period problem be denoted by Δ , where $\Delta = e^{-r/2}$, where r is the real rate of interest.

The LDC has an initial level of governance \mathbf{g}_1 determined by its extant institutions, in particular rules and enforcement machinery. The donor is interested in maximizing the level of governance at the end of the planning horizon:

[Two-period aid–governance program] Given a fixed aid budget $\mathcal{A} > 0$, the donor provides aid $\mathcal{A}_1 \geq 0$ to the LDC at $t = 1$ asking it to engage in reforms so as to improve its governance level to \mathbf{g}_2 . At $t = 2$, the donor provides a further aid of $\mathcal{A}_2 \geq 0$ provided the governance level at $t = 2$ is at least \mathbf{g}_2 . In case the governance level falls short of \mathbf{g}_2 , no further aid is provided. For simplicity we assume that the approved

fund for aid \mathcal{A} does not earn any interest over the period under consideration,²⁴ hence

$$\mathcal{A}_1 + \mathcal{A}_2 \leq \mathcal{A}. \quad (1)$$

The donor's problem. The donor's problem is to design an appropriate aid program so as to maximize g_2 subject to (a) the incentive constraint that the LDC delivers g_2 , and (b) the financial constraint that the available funds are sufficient to cover the costs of reforms. Further, the donor can *commit* to this conditional aid program, in that it cannot renege on its aid commitment of \mathcal{A}_2 in period 2 provided the governance improvement has been implemented. This is important since clearly part of the last-period aid, \mathcal{A}_2 , will be diverted by the elite without generating any governance improvements.²⁵

The *incentive compatibility constraint* (in short, IC) facing the LDC elite at $t = 1$ is given by:

$$\alpha(g_1)[\mathcal{A}_1 - C(g_2 - g_1)] + \Delta \cdot \alpha(g_2)\mathcal{A}_2 \geq \alpha(g_1)\mathcal{A}_1,$$

where the RHS denotes the immediate payoff to the elite if they decide to renege on the contract and appropriate the maximal possible payoff immediately, whereas the LHS is the sum of its payoff at $t = 1$ in case it decides to invest in improving governance to g_2 . Simplifying, we obtain:

$$\frac{\Delta \cdot \alpha(g_2)\mathcal{A}_2}{\alpha(g_1)} \geq C(g_2 - g_1). \quad (2)$$

The LDC also faces a *financial constraint* (or FC) in that the aid available at $t = 1$ must be enough to fund the suggested reforms:

$$\mathcal{A}_1 \geq C(g_2 - g_1). \quad (3)$$

Definition 1. *Given an aid budget of $\mathcal{A} > 0$, an aid-governance program $(\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_1, \tilde{g}_2; \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2)$ will be referred to as a 2-round optimal program if it maximizes g_2 subject to (1), (2) and (3).*

We start with an observation on the ideal aid-governance program. The proof is available in supplementary materials.

Lemma 1. *The optimal aid-governance program must involve gradualism in the sense that (i) the donor spreads the aid over two periods, i.e. $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_1 > 0$, $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2 > 0$, and (ii) the level of governance improves over time, i.e. $\tilde{g}_2 > g_1$.*

²⁴In reality of course the aid fund \mathcal{A} can be put in an interest earning account. Alternatively, the cost of borrowing money from the Wall Street by a donor organization would be lower the earlier the tranche is. However we abstract from these complications.

²⁵In later sections we shall examine the implications of different degrees of commitment for the three-period problem.

The result is intuitive, since either giving away the entire aid in the first round, or delaying all aid until the second, will achieve zero reform.

Next a more complete characterization of the optimal aid program follows. The proof is in the Appendix.

Proposition 1 (Two rounds better than one). *In the optimal solution both the incentive constraint (2) and the financial constraint (3) must hold with equality, determining the maximum implementable governance, $\tilde{g}_2 > 0$, uniquely. Further,*

- (i) *In period 1, aid is just enough to cover the expenses towards governance improvement, i.e., $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_1 = C(\tilde{g}_2 - g_1) > 0$.*
- (ii) *The aid in period 2, $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2 > 0$, is not spent on governance improvement at all. Out of the aid $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2$, only $(1 - \alpha(\tilde{g}_2))\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2$ trickles down to the poor and $\alpha(\tilde{g}_2)\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2$ is diverted by the elite.*
- (iii) *$\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2 > \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_1$, i.e., the donor must allocate a greater share of the aid for period 2 for the elite to accept the demand for reforms.*

An interesting aspect of the optimal program is that the aid trajectory is rising. The reason is simple – improving governance means the elite can divert less of the aid and so they must be compensated in the form of higher future aid so as not to divert the maximum possible amount, $\alpha(g_1)\mathcal{A}_1$. Another point to be noted is that aid diversion happens only in the last period. Offering slack in period 1 financing is not optimal. Since improvement in governance happens only in period 1, it is better to leave the carrot till the improvement has already taken place so that aid diversion would be minimal. In contrast, in section 5 we will see that in a three-period problem leaving slack in period 2 is a plausible aid policy.

Let us now write the incentive and financial constraints, (2) and (3), as equalities:

$$\frac{\Delta \cdot \alpha(g_2)\mathcal{A}_2}{\alpha(g_1)} = C(g_2 - g_1), \quad (4)$$

$$\mathcal{A}_1 = C(g_2 - g_1). \quad (5)$$

Denote the resulting g_2 by \tilde{g}_2 .

From (4), (5) and the budget balancing condition, we have $\frac{\alpha(g_2)[A - C(g_2 - g_1)]}{C(g_2 - g_1)} = 1/\Delta$. Given Assumption 1, in particular the properties that $\alpha(g)$ is strictly decreasing and $C(\cdot)$ strictly increasing, we have the following result:

Proposition 2. *The implementable governance level \tilde{g}_2 is strictly increasing in the overall aid budget, \mathcal{A} .*

4 Three-period horizon

In the rest of this paper we focus on the case where aid is provided in three equally spaced tranches. We thus extend the donor's aid horizon from two periods to three, so that $t = 1, 2, 3$. Let the discount factor applicable to the three-period problem be denoted by δ , where $\delta = e^{-r/3}$, where we recall that r is the real rate of interest. We examine if the donor would optimally like to spread the aid over more than two periods. Related issues of interest are the time profile of aid and the pattern of reforms – whether the approach should be one of starting with small improvements and growing, or getting the major boost early on and then slowing down. While for $C(g' - g)$ strictly convex (i.e. increasing marginal cost) efficiency considerations may favour a staggered approach, when $C(g' - g)$ is linear this effect is no longer at play. For a significant part of our analysis we are going to assume $C(g' - g)$ to be weakly convex (thus admitting linearity), as in Assumption 1. Also, we will analyze the implications of full and partial commitment with regard to future aid.

■ *Feasibility, incentive compatibility and some definitions.* The donor's objective is to maximize g_3 subject to the various incentive and financial constraints at both $t = 1$ and $t = 2$. The donor offers a *conditional commitment* contract whereby the pattern and quantum of per period aid is conditional on the LDC's performance on the governance front. Further, the donor commits to terminating the contract should the recipient fail to deliver on the promise of governance improvement.

[**Three-period aid–governance program**] The donor provides aid of \mathcal{A}_1 to the LDC at $t = 1$, asking it to implement reforms immediately so that the governance level improves to g_2 in the next period. At $t = 2$, provided the achieved governance level is at least g_2 the donor provides further aid of \mathcal{A}_2 asking the LDC to improve its governance level to g_3 in the next period. If the governance level at the end of period 2 is at least g_3 , then the donor provides further aid of \mathcal{A}_3 in period 3. In case the governance level at the end of period t , $t = 1, 2$, is less than g_{t+1} , then the aid program is immediately stopped.

Thus an aid–governance program can be denoted by the profile

$$(\mathcal{A}_1, g_2; \mathcal{A}_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}_3).$$

We next turn to formalizing the various incentive and financial constraints. Given that the whole of the aid amount \mathcal{A} is to be distributed over the three periods, we have

$$\mathcal{A}_1 + \mathcal{A}_2 + \mathcal{A}_3 = \mathcal{A}. \tag{6}$$

The IC constraint at $t = 2$ is given by:

$$\alpha(g_2)[\mathcal{A}_2 - C(g_3 - g_2)] + \delta\alpha(g_3)\mathcal{A}_3 \geq \alpha(g_2)\mathcal{A}_2,$$

where the RHS is the payoff to the elite if it decides to renege on the contract and appropriate the maximal possible payoff immediately, whereas the LHS is the sum of its payoff at $t = 2$ in case it decides to invest in improving governance to g_3 . Simplifying, we obtain

$$\frac{\delta\alpha(g_3)\mathcal{A}_3}{\alpha(g_2)} \geq C(g_3 - g_2). \quad (7)$$

The LDC also faces a financial constraint in that the aid available at $t = 2$ must be enough to fund the suggested reforms:

$$\mathcal{A}_2 \geq C(g_3 - g_2). \quad (8)$$

Next, assuming that the IC at $t = 2$ will be respected, the IC constraint at $t = 1$ is given by²⁶

$$\alpha(g_1)[\mathcal{A}_1 - C(g_2 - g_1)] + \delta\alpha(g_2)[\mathcal{A}_2 - C(g_3 - g_2)] + \delta^2\alpha(g_3)\mathcal{A}_3 \geq \alpha(g_1)\mathcal{A}_1.$$

Re-organizing, we have

$$\frac{\delta\alpha(g_2)[\mathcal{A}_2 - C(g_3 - g_2)]}{\alpha(g_1)} + \frac{\delta^2\alpha(g_3)\mathcal{A}_3}{\alpha(g_1)} \geq C(g_2 - g_1). \quad (9)$$

And the financial constraint at $t = 1$ is given by

$$\mathcal{A}_1 \geq C(g_2 - g_1). \quad (10)$$

Definition 2. Given g_1 and the aid budget \mathcal{A} , a program $(\mathcal{A}_1, g_2; \mathcal{A}_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}_3)$ is feasible if it satisfies the budget, incentive and financial constraints (6)–(10).

We shall focus on two classes of programs, both equally natural depending on the context, with different degrees of commitment on the part of the donor. Under *full conditional commitment* (henceforth FCC), the donor can commit to the period 2 and period 3 programs at $t = 1$ itself. This implies that the aid–governance program under FCC need not be time consistent, in the sense that the optimal program prescribed from $t = 2$ onwards need not

²⁶Eventually we are going to characterize aid mechanisms immune to violation of IC at every period, so we do not write separately IC at $t = 1$ when IC at $t = 2$ is violated.

maximize donor utility standing at $t = 2$. We shall also examine a scenario with *partial conditional commitment* (henceforth PCC), where the donor cannot commit to the program from $t = 2$ onwards. What the donor can commit to is that, subject to the governance level being at least g_2 at $t = 2$, it will offer another conditional contract for the remaining two periods, where the total aid budget is going to be $\mathcal{A} - \mathcal{A}_1$. Clearly the PCC program involves time consistency.

Whether FCC or PCC is more natural depends on the donor’s specific charter, i.e., whether it is capable of making a commitment. If the donor is a durable financial institution such as the World Bank or the IMF, and moreover is not directly answerable to the public,²⁷ then FCC would be natural.²⁸ If, however, the aid budget is approved by a country’s current government, the power to plan out fully the aid sequence may be limited especially if the aid horizon outlasts the government’s tenure. In such cases requiring time consistency, leading to a PCC program, might be more plausible. In fact if aid is bilateral – from one country to another – the threat of conditional aid with intermittent re-evaluation while asking the recipient country to make the necessary reforms is more credible, as exemplified by recent discussions in the UK about their aid policies.²⁹ After all, the donor country’s government is answerable to its electorate.

We next consider these two alternative programs in more detail.

Given g_1 and the aid budget \mathcal{A} , an aid–governance program $(\mathcal{A}_1, g_2; \mathcal{A}_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}_3)$ is optimal under full conditional commitment if it solves the following problem:

$$\begin{aligned} & \max g_3 \\ & \text{subject to :} \quad \text{feasibility conditions (6) – (10).} \end{aligned}$$

Denote the optimal FCC program by $(\hat{\mathcal{A}}_1, \hat{g}_2; \hat{\mathcal{A}}_2, \hat{g}_3; \hat{\mathcal{A}}_3)$.

Definition 3. *An aid–governance program $(\mathcal{A}_1, g_2; \mathcal{A}_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}_3)$ is said to be time consistent if $(\mathcal{A}_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}_3)$ maximizes donor utility starting in period 2, with a starting aid $\mathcal{A} - \mathcal{A}_1$.*

²⁷Consider Kanbur (2000)’s account of how the World Bank caved in to external pressures for not enforcing conditionality clauses regarding African debt. While this shows the difficulty of commitment itself, an issue also underlined by Svensson (2003), it suggests that organizations like the World Bank are perhaps more likely to fit in the FCC mold.

²⁸Conway (2003) says: “Pakistan has a long history as a user of IMF credit facilities. This history can be broken into two parts: the initial generation (1958-1978) of non-cancelled and nearly completely disbursed arrangements, and a subsequent generation (1980-2000) of arrangements with limited disbursement and frequent cancellation.”

²⁹As recently as January 2012, politicians in the UK were calling for greater checks on foreign aid: “Aid given by the UK to countries with a history of fraud and corruption should be ‘conditional’ on them improving their governance, MPs have said.” Source: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-16410677>.

We operationalize the notion of time consistency by observing that the donor’s problem in period 2 is identical to the two-period problem analyzed in section 3. Thus from Proposition 2, *time consistency* requires that the financial constraint for $t = 2$, i.e. (8), will be binding along with the IC at $t = 2$, i.e., condition (7). These equations will yield, uniquely, the solutions $g_3(g_2, \mathcal{A}_1)$ and $\mathcal{A}_2(g_2, \mathcal{A}_1)$. We are now in a position to define optimality under PCC.

Given g_1 and the aid budget \mathcal{A} , an aid–governance program $(\mathcal{A}_1, g_2; \mathcal{A}_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}_3)$ is optimal under partial conditional commitment, if it solves the following problem:

$$\begin{aligned} & \max g_3 \\ \text{subject to :} & \quad \text{feasibility constraints (6) – (10), and time consistency.} \end{aligned}$$

Denote the optimal PCC program by $(\mathcal{A}_1^*, g_2^*; \mathcal{A}_2^*, g_3^*; \mathcal{A}_3^*)$.

Before proceeding with the formal analysis, let us fix a few concepts that form the principal themes of this paper.

Definition 4. *In the three-period problem, an aid–governance scheme $(\mathcal{A}_1, g_2; \mathcal{A}_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}_3)$ satisfies gradualism if and only if it involves*

1. *gradualism in aid, i.e. $\mathcal{A}_i > 0, i = 1, 2, 3$, and*
2. *gradualism in governance, i.e. $g_3 > g_2 > g_1$.*

An aid–governance plan is to be referred as a quick-fix if, not only is all of the aid disbursed but also all of the prescribed governance improvement is to be achieved within the first two periods, i.e. the scheme is simply $(\mathcal{A}_1, g_2; \mathcal{A}_2, g_2; 0)$.

It may be noted that, in principle, there is nothing to rule out $g_3 > g_2 > g_1$ with an accompanying aid program of $\mathcal{A}_1 > 0, \mathcal{A}_2 = 0$ and $\mathcal{A}_3 > 0$. Such a scheme must incentivize the recipient to carry on with the improvement of governance from g_2 to g_3 even if no interim aid, $\mathcal{A}_2 > 0$, is provided. But for this to happen, the aid recipient must carry forward some $\mathcal{S} > 0$ surplus fund from period 1 efforts to period 2 activities rather than stealing it. But then the aid authority should be able to understand the incentive, and thus hold back the \mathcal{S} amount from \mathcal{A}_1 to alter second-period aid from $\mathcal{A}_2 = 0$ to $\mathcal{A}_2 = \mathcal{S}$. Our definitions of gradualism in governance improvement and aid gradualism, therefore, go hand-in-hand: one implies the other.

Definition 5. *An aid–governance mechanism $(\mathcal{A}_1, g_2; \mathcal{A}_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}_3)$ satisfies the “starting small and grow later” principle (henceforth SSSL) if and only if*

1. it involves SSGL in aid, i.e. $\mathcal{A}_1 < \mathcal{A}_2 < \mathcal{A}_3$, and
2. it involves SSGL in governance, i.e. $g_3 - g_2 > g_2 - g_1 > 0$.

Aid gradualism does not necessarily imply SSGL in aid, i.e. the starting small principle in aid disbursement. Nor does gradualism in governance imply SSGL in governance improvement. SSGL is thus a stronger form of gradualism.

5 Full commitment and gradualism

We begin by showing that for the same overall aid and allotted time span, an aid program achieves better governance if it involves three rounds, rather than two. Further, the improvement in governance involves progress being made in each stage rather than in one single push, suggesting that a gradual approach is a better strategy for aid givers. Further, the results developed in this section will allow us to argue, in the following section, that the optimal aid program may involve tolerating some aid diversion in the second period.

Proposition 3 (Three rounds better than two). *Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Fixing the available aid budget at $\mathcal{A} > 0$, the optimal aid program under full commitment will exhibit the following characteristics:*

- (i) *A three-period program of governance improvement dominates the quick-fix solution involving only two periods. That is, the final governance level achievable is strictly higher in a three-period program.*
- (ii) *In the three-period setup, governance improvement occurs gradually with $\hat{g}_3 > \hat{g}_2 > g_1$ and $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_i > 0, i = 1, 2, 3$.*

While the formal proof can be found in the Appendix, the idea is as follows. Note that in the optimal two-period program the aid promised for the final round, $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2$, does not contribute to governance improvement. With an extended three-period horizon, part of this amount $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2$ can be moved to period 3, conditioning the release of this amount on further reforms in the second period. Intuitively, this generates a trade-off. First, since the aid amount is split up into smaller tranches, the gain from deviating in any one period is smaller. On the other hand, the gain from complying also gets smaller, since, because of governance improvements, aid diversion gets more difficult. However, in the optimal contract the first effect necessarily dominates since the donor can always design the associated reforms in an appropriate fashion. Consequently the reform agenda can be pushed further. Interestingly,

this intuition follows purely from the logic of gradualism, and does not require the cost function $C(\cdot)$ to be convex.

Formally, one can split the aid amount earmarked for period 2 under the optimal two-period program between periods 2 and 3 while maintaining the original g_2 and setting $g_3 = g_2$ (i.e. no real improvement in the final round). With positive aid retained in period 2, g_2 can now be lowered slightly (to some g'_2) that is made up for by requiring an equivalent g -improvement in period 3 to maintain $g_3 = g_2$. And this is possible without prompting aid diversion from the set governance objectives in period 1 or period 2, due to a combination of weak convexity of the cost function $C(\cdot)$, strictly decreasing $\alpha(g)$, and interim aid diversion opportunity in period 2 (see Step 3 of the proof). Finally, as g_2 is lowered all of the constraints become slack so that the final g can be increased at the end of period 3 beyond the original g_2 .³⁰

As a counterpart to Proposition 3, a relevant question is the implementation of a target level of governance and an appropriate time frame for it.³¹ It is plausible that for any given time frame, two periods or three periods, the higher the aid budget the higher the implementable g , giving rise to an upward-sloping function $g(\mathcal{A}, \tau), \tau = 2, 3$. Then by Proposition 3, $g(\mathcal{A}, 3) > g(\mathcal{A}, 2)$ over the range of g implementable under both time horizons. Put differently, for any target \bar{g} implementation costs would be strictly lower with a gradual approach compared to that with a quick-fix solution, i.e., $\mathcal{A}(\bar{g}, 3) < \mathcal{A}(\bar{g}, 2)$.

Thus from a purely financial point of view, the lower implementation costs may justify aid agencies adopting a measured wait-and-see approach to governance reforms and keeping the recipient country on a tight leash. This result should remain valid under a moderate degree of discounting.

The next result is technical, suggesting how the various constraints impact on the optimal aid program (the proof is relegated to supplementary materials). Part of the characterization will be used below (in Proposition 5) to determine the optimal time structure of aid.

Proposition 4 (Optimal FCC program). *Suppose Assumption 1 holds. With the feasibility requirements (6)–(10), the donor’s optimal program can be partially characterized as follows:*

- (i) *Both the period 1 financial constraint, (10), and the period 2 incentive constraint, (7), must be binding.*

³⁰While the argument relies on “small changes” and thus might appear to be a local analysis, the dominance through gradualism is of a general nature. It only suggests that the dominance is possible without necessarily exploiting the best possible mechanism.

³¹A related question is how the governance level is affected as the recipient becomes more patient. This we address later in Proposition 6.

- (ii) *At least one of the two constraints – the period 2 financial constraint, (8), and the period 1 incentive compatibility constraint, (9) – must bind.*
- (iii) *If the equilibrium governance improvement program satisfies a weaker version of SSGL, i.e. $\hat{g}_3 - \hat{g}_2 \geq \hat{g}_2 - g_1$, then the constraint (9) would bind.*

Intuitively, the period 1 financial constraint binds because, with the aid program starting in period 1, any slack in period 1 cannot be used to incentivize either current or future reforms. Similarly, if the incentive constraint in the second period is slack, this means that the aid allocated to the last period, i.e. $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_3$, can be re-allocated as follows. Let us reduce $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_3$ by a small amount (this has no financial implications as there is no reform in period 3), and re-distribute the amount so freed up between $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_1$ and $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_2$ without affecting the incentive constraint in period 2. This relaxes all the constraints so that the reforms agenda can be pushed further.

Given part (ii), any of three combinations can characterize the optimal aid contract: both (8) and (9) binding; only (8) binding and (9) non-binding; and (8) non-binding and (9) binding. The first possibility yields all constraints binding, and the second possibility keeps aid diversion incentives in check with the final round aid diversion, $\alpha(g_3)\mathcal{A}_3$, strictly dominating earlier round opportunities. The third possibility offers an interesting policy direction, analyzed below under the heading: interim aid diversion.

Proposition 4 is a partial characterization. More structure can be put on the optimal aid scheme under the additional assumption that $C(\cdot)$ is additively separable. Specifically, a partial ranking of \mathcal{A}_1 , \mathcal{A}_2 and \mathcal{A}_3 is now possible.

Assumption 2. *For any $g' > g$, $C(g' - g) = C(g') - C(g)$.*

Assumption 2 allows for linear cost functions so long as we retain Assumption 1 and thus $C(0) = 0$. The proof can be found in the Appendix.

Proposition 5 (Time structure of aid). *Suppose both Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.*

- (i) *In the solution of the FCC problem, the period 1 incentive compatibility constraint (9) must bind.*
- (ii) $\alpha(g_1)\hat{\mathcal{A}}_1 = \delta\alpha(\hat{g}_2)\hat{\mathcal{A}}_2 \geq \delta^2\alpha(\hat{g}_3)\hat{\mathcal{A}}_3$ and $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_1 < \hat{\mathcal{A}}_2$.

Remark 1. Given Proposition 5(ii), it is natural to ask if it is possible to rank $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_3$ vis-à-vis $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_2$. Unfortunately, numerical simulations show that the results can go either way, so that the time profile of aid could be non-monotonic. Consider the case where $\alpha(g) = 1 - g$, and

$g_1 = 0$. When $C(x)$ is linear, $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_3 > \hat{\mathcal{A}}_2$ for all $\mathcal{A} \in \{1.1, 1.2, \dots, 2\}$, and when $C(x) = x^2$, $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_3 > \hat{\mathcal{A}}_2$ for $\mathcal{A} \in \{1, 1.1, \dots, 1.5\}$, and $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_3 < \hat{\mathcal{A}}_2$ for $\mathcal{A} \in \{1.6, 1.7, \dots, 2\}$.³²

Another related issue is whether the optimal aid program follows SSGL, i.e. $\hat{g}_3 - \hat{g}_2 > \hat{g}_2 - g_1$, or not. Again numerical simulations suggest that the answer could go either way. Consider the case where $\alpha(g) = 1 - g$, and $g_1 = 0$. When $C(x)$ is linear, SSGL holds for $\mathcal{A} \in \{1.1, 1.2, \dots, 1.6\}$, but it does not hold for $\mathcal{A} \in \{1.8, 1.9, 2\}$; when $C(x) = x^2$, SSGL is never satisfied for any $\mathcal{A} \in \{1.1, 1.2, \dots, 2\}$. This ambiguity arises solely because of non-binding (8).

In contrast, under time consistency, to be studied in the next section, we will see that both aid and governance improvement will have strictly upward trajectories.

6 Full commitment and aid diversion

In this section we argue that the aid scheme may involve the donor knowingly tolerate aid diversion by the political elite in the recipient country. This implies that governance improvement may be consistent with ignoring short-run economic objectives (as also argued by [Drazen \(2000\)](#)), thus providing a partial explanation of an observation in the literature, notably by [Dollar and Svensson \(1998\)](#), that conditionality has had no impact on the success of loans, the argument being that in some of these studies success was possibly defined in terms of immediate economic criteria rather than long term governance goals.³³ Similarly, [Morrissey \(2004a\)](#) argues that while conditionality was largely successful in ensuring governance reforms in sub-Saharan Africa, the results regarding export performance is decidedly mixed.³⁴ While the literature has argued that this gap between improvements in governance and economic outcomes can be attributed to shocks ([Morrissey \(2004a\)](#)), as well as administrative weaknesses ([Morrissey \(1999\)](#)), our analysis suggests a possible alternative reason.

This point also brings to our attention a warning in January 2012 by the (then) International Development Secretary of UK, Andrew Mitchell, who said: “We make absolutely clear to countries that transparency and good governance are vital. We are prepared to withhold funding to governments when our standards are not met, as we have done in Malawi.” (Source: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-16410677>). To put this warning

³²Simulations appear in supplementary materials, Tables [B.2](#) and [B.3](#).

³³[Dollar and Svensson \(1998\)](#) examine the performance of World Bank loans over the period 1980–1995. While they find that political variables are important in explaining loan success, conditionality and other World Bank inputs seem to have no impact.

³⁴This is also in line with our discussion in the introduction, that while aid conditionality does seem to have a positive impact on policy outcomes, the impact on economic outcomes is not that straightforward (recall the discussion on trade policy reform in sub-Saharan Africa ([Morrissey \(2001\)](#), [Morrissey \(2004b\)](#))).

in perspective, despite the tough talk our analysis suggests that it may be wise to adopt a pragmatic approach when dealing with rent-seeking governments: provide slack to the powerful political elite along the way to improve governance in the long run.

Formally, we shall argue that the optimal contract may involve leaving a rent for the recipient in the second period whenever the aid \mathcal{A} is large enough. Moreover, such rent is increasing in \mathcal{A} . Next, turning to the analysis, recall that under the FCC program, the IC at $t = 2$, i.e. (7), as well as the FC at $t = 1$, i.e. (10), bind (see Proposition 4). From (6), (7), (8) and (10), we can then eliminate \mathcal{A}_1 , \mathcal{A}_2 and \mathcal{A}_3 , to obtain (11). Similarly, we can use (6), (7), (9) and (10) to obtain (12):

$$F(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}) \equiv \mathcal{A} - C(g_2 - g_1) - \frac{\alpha(g_2)C(g_3 - g_2)}{\delta\alpha(g_3)} - C(g_3 - g_2) \geq 0, \quad (11)$$

$$I(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}) \equiv \mathcal{A} - C(g_2 - g_1) - \frac{\alpha(g_2)C(g_3 - g_2)}{\delta\alpha(g_3)} - \frac{\alpha(g_1)C(g_2 - g_1)}{\delta\alpha(g_2)} \geq 0. \quad (12)$$

Thus, (11) (respectively (12)) captures the financial constraint at $t = 2$ (respectively the incentive constraint at $t = 1$), subject to both the financial constraint at $t = 1$, and the incentive constraint at $t = 2$ binding. The inequalities (11) and (12), determining the set of feasible outcomes (g_2, g_3) under the FCC program, together constitute the key to the subsequent analysis. Denote the partial and cross partial derivatives by:

$$(F_i(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}), F_{ij}(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}); I_i(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}), I_{ij}(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})),$$

where the subscripts i and j refer to the i -th and j -th arguments.

It is easy to see that $F(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})$ and $I(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})$ are both strictly decreasing in g_3 (see Lemma 2 below). Hence for any given g_2 , there can be at most one g_3 that solves $F(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}) = 0$. Likewise at most one g_3 can solve $I(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}) = 0$.

Definition 6. Let $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ solve $F(g_2, f(g_2, \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) = 0$, and $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ solve $I(g_2, i(g_2, \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) = 0$.³⁵

Thus $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ (respectively $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$) represents the final level of governance, i.e. g_3 , that ensures that the financial constraint at $t = 2$ (respectively the incentive compatibility constraint at $t = 1$) binds, subject to both the financial constraint at $t = 1$, and the incentive compatibility constraint at $t = 2$, binding. These two functions play a critical role in the analysis.

³⁵While, in the optimal program, both (11) and (12) must hold, the solution to (11) need not satisfy the IC at $t = 1$, and the solution to (12) need not satisfy the FC at $t = 2$.

Before proceeding to the formal analysis, it may be useful to describe our approach graphically. Plotting $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ and $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ against g_2 (see Fig. 1), we observe that the area below the lower envelope of these two curves define the (g_2, g_3) pairs that satisfy all the ICs and the FCs. In particular, we shall find that under conditions that are not too stringent, $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ is single-peaked with a peak at g_2^* . Consequently, if the peak of $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ lies ‘below’ the graph of $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$, then the optimal governance level g_3^* is attained at $g_2^* = \operatorname{argmax} i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$. Given that this peak lies below the graph of $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$, there will be interim aid diversion. In the rest of this section we seek to develop intuitive conditions such that $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ is single-peaked. Further, we examine how the level of aid \mathcal{A} affects whether there is interim aid diversion or not.

The following lemma states several properties of $F(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})$, $I(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})$, $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ and $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ that will be needed in the subsequent analysis, with the proof provided in supplementary materials.

Lemma 2. *Consider $F(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})$, $I(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})$, $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ and $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$.*

- (i) $F(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})$ and $I(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})$ are both strictly decreasing in g_3 . Moreover, $F_2(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}) < I_2(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}) < 0$.
- (ii) $I_1(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}) < F_1(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})$.
- (iii) Whenever either $g_3 - g_2 \geq g_2 - g_1$, or $C(\cdot)$ is linear, it follows that $F_1(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}) > 0$, and $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ is strictly decreasing in g_2 .
- (iv) $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})|_{g_2=g_1} > f(g_2, \mathcal{A})|_{g_2=g_1}$.
- (v) $I_{12}(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}) > 0$.
- (vi) $I_{11}(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}) < 0$, whenever $\alpha(\cdot)$ and $C(\cdot)$ are both linear.

Assumption 3 below specifies more general versions of properties stated in Lemma 2(iii) and 2(vi). Our numerical simulations (see the Appendix) suggest that Assumption 3(ii) below will be satisfied whenever $\alpha(\cdot)$ and $C(\cdot)$ are both linear.

Assumption 3. (i) $F_1(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}) > 0$ and $I_{11}(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}) < 0$.

(ii) Let there exist $\tilde{g}(\mathcal{A}) > g_1$ such that $i(g_2, \mathcal{A}) > g_2$ if and only if $g_2 < \tilde{g}(\mathcal{A})$.

$g_2^*(\mathcal{A})$ defined below will play a key role in the analysis:

$$g_2^*(\mathcal{A}) = \operatorname{argmax}_{g_1 \leq g_2 \leq \tilde{g}(\mathcal{A})} i(g_2, \mathcal{A}). \quad (13)$$

For ease of exposition let us assume that $g_2^*(\mathcal{A}) < \tilde{g}(\mathcal{A})$. Note that Assumption 3(ii) then ensures that $i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A}) > g_2^*(\mathcal{A})$.




Figure 1: Sample Mathematica plot (interim aid diversion), $\alpha = 1 - g$, $C(x) = x^2$, $g_1 = 0$, $\mathcal{A} = 1.9$; g_3 maximized at $g_2 = 0.585275$

The following lemma is a key step in our analysis of interim aid diversion. Lemma 3(i) ensures that $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ has a unique peak at g_2^* . We then use this result to provide a characterization of interim aid diversion in part (ii) (see Fig. 1), that says that there is interim aid diversion if and only if the peak of $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ lies below the graph of $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$. Lemma 3(ii) is, in turn, later used in Proposition 6 to argue that the level of aid has a close connection with both the existence and magnitude of aid diversion. The proof of this Lemma can be found in supplementary materials.

Lemma 3. *Suppose Assumption 3 holds. Then the following are true:*

- (i) $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ is strictly increasing for all $g_2 < g_2^*$, and strictly decreasing for all $g_2 > g_2^*$.

(ii) *There will be interim aid diversion if and only if $i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A}) < f(g_2^*, \mathcal{A})$.*

What is the reasoning behind the slack in period 2 financial constraint, i.e. (8)? Intuitively, the goal is to incentivize reform in period 1. This would lead to a higher g_2 that, due to the synergy between g_2 and g_3 as far as incentives are concerned (formally $I_{12} > 0$, recall Lemma 2(v)), will translate into a higher g_3 . With slack in period 2, the elite has a greater incentive to deliver on expected improvement in period 1 and avail of the slack. But, why should the donor create slack in period 2, rather than shifting the amount to period 3? This is because a transfer of Δ dollars from the final round reward \mathcal{A}_3 to \mathcal{A}_2 , increases the recipient's second-period margin by $[\alpha(g_2) - \alpha(g_3)]\Delta > 0$. This, in turn, will ease the first-period financial constraint (9) because $\alpha(g_2) > \alpha(g_3)$. Given this slack created in the first-period financial constraint, the donor can now use the amount so freed up to push up g_3 . This allows the donor to sustain greater reforms overall.

We next use Lemma 3(ii) to argue that there will be interim aid diversion for sufficiently large aid. Graphically, the proof hinges on showing that $f(g_2^*, \mathcal{A}) - i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A})$ is increasing in \mathcal{A} . Thus if $f(g_2^*, \mathcal{A}) - i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A})$ is positive for some \mathcal{A} , implying that there is aid diversion, then there must be aid diversion for any larger \mathcal{A} . Also, we establish two comparative statics results – how governance improvement is affected as the level of aid and the discount factor changes. The proof of the following proposition can be found in the Appendix.

Proposition 6 (Interim aid diversion). *Suppose Assumption 3 holds.*

1. *The optimal governance in period 3, i.e. g_3^* , is strictly increasing in the amount of total aid \mathcal{A} , as well as the discount factor δ .*
2. *Further, suppose that with an increase in g_2 , the incentive constraint in period 1 is relaxed to a significant extent, more formally $I_{12}(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}) > \frac{I_{11}(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})F_2(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{F_1(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}$. Then the following are true:*

- (i) *There exists $\mathcal{A}^* \geq 0$ such that there will be interim aid diversion if and only if $\mathcal{A} > \mathcal{A}^*$.*
- (ii) *The amount of interim aid diversion increases with \mathcal{A} .*

We already know that interim aid diversion is a way of increasing g_2 , and eventually g_3 . However, why should a large volume of aid lead to interim aid diversion, and further, why should an increase in \mathcal{A} lead to an increase in its magnitude? This has to do with the assumption that an increase in g_2 relaxes the incentive constraint at $t = 1$ to a *significant* extent, so that aid diversion becomes a potentially important channel for increasing g_3 as

well. The cost of allowing interim aid diversion is of course that the amount left over in period 3 will be smaller, which will make it harder to incentivize an increase in g_3 in the second period. With \mathcal{A} large, the marginal cost of adopting such an approach is comparatively small, explaining both the diversion and its magnitude.

Aid diversion percentage. Following Proposition 6-2(ii), it may be natural to ask if the *percentage* of aid diversion is also increasing in \mathcal{A} . While an analytical answer is hard to establish, based on numerical simulation presented in supplementary materials we can state the following:

Let $g_1 = 0$ and $\alpha(g) = 1 - g$:

(i) Consider a linear cost function, i.e. $C(x) = x$. Then, $\forall \mathcal{A} \in [1.4, 1.5, \dots, 2]$, there is interim aid diversion. Further, the proportional slack, i.e. $\frac{\hat{A}_2 - (\hat{g}_3 - \hat{g}_2)}{\mathcal{A}}$, is strictly increasing in \mathcal{A} for these values of \mathcal{A} .

(ii) Consider a convex cost function, in particular $C(x) = x^2$. Then, $\forall \mathcal{A} \in [1.0, 1.1, \dots, 2]$, there is interim aid diversion. Further, the proportional slack, i.e. $\frac{\hat{A}_2 - (\hat{g}_3 - \hat{g}_2)^2}{\mathcal{A}}$, is strictly increasing in \mathcal{A} for these values of \mathcal{A} .

Finally, while extending the analysis to more than three rounds makes the analysis quite intractable, here we briefly discuss possible qualitative implications of such extension. First, note that allowing for more than three rounds, say a fourth one, will not affect gradualism of the aid program. This is because the donor can always specify a program where no aid is provided in the first round, and then from second round onwards follow a program that mimics that for the case when there are only three rounds. Of course, the discounting rate associated with the two programs will be different.³⁶ A more interesting question is what happens to the interim aid diversion result when more than three rounds are allowed. Intuitively, it appears that the aggregate amount of aid diversion should decrease: With longer horizon the donor will have more flexibility and so does not have to rely on costly tactics to achieve its end. In reality, of course, adopting too many rounds of aid would also add to the complexity of the program and increase transactions costs.

7 Partial commitment

■ *Aid structure under PCC.* Adding renegotiation in the aid contract following each round, subject to satisfactory progress in governance, alters the donor's feasible program since it weakens the donor's hand relative to the full commitment program. As a result, the

³⁶This is essentially the same argument that we used while showing that the three-period program will involve gradualism.

implementable level of governance can only (weakly) worsen. We first analyze the optimal aid mechanism under time consistency, then compare it with the mechanism under full commitment.

The following result is a summary presentation of Lemma A.1 stated in the Appendix (and proved in supplementary materials).

Proposition 7 (Characterization). *Suppose Assumption 1 holds.*

- (i) *Then in the optimal PCC program both pairs of incentive and financial constraints, (7)–(10), will bind.*
- (ii) *There will be no interim aid diversion.*

Interestingly, and in contrast to the result under FCC, we find that the aid package under PCC does not involve interim aid diversion. This is so because time consistency requires the aid package to be freshly calculated after round 1. Since the idea behind interim aid diversion under FCC is to incentivize reforms in period 1, interim aid diversion becomes redundant in period 2, and will be dispensed with under PCC. This suggests, for example, that interim aid diversion is more likely to be used whenever the donor country has a stable government which is likely to outlast the aid horizon, or the aid department is independent and can commit to a long-term program.

Building on the above characterization and Lemma A.1 we obtain our main result under PCC (the proof is in the Appendix):

Proposition 8 (Strong gradualism). *Suppose Assumption 1 holds. In the three-period PCC problem, the optimal aid mechanism involves gradualism as well as the SSSL principle:*

- (i) $g_3^* > g_2^* > g_1$ and $\mathcal{A}_3^* > \mathcal{A}_2^* > \mathcal{A}_1^* > 0$.
- (ii) $g_3^* - g_2^* > g_2^* - g_1 > 0$.
- (iii) *The final governance level achievable under a three-period setup is higher than under a two-period setup.*

Note that despite the fact the donor faces greater constraints under PCC because of the time consistency requirement, the three-period program continues to prevail over a two-period scheme. This confirms the power of aid gradualism to deliver on improvements.

Further, both aid levels and governance improvements exhibit the *SSGL* property, or what might be termed as *strong gradualism*. The principle of “starting small and grow later” for conditional commitment has been previously noted in other applications, for instance,

Watson (2002) and Klimentko et al. (2008). Its application in the context of aid conditionality should thus be of interest.

Both these results are especially noteworthy as Assumption 1 imposes no restrictions on the curvature of the governance improvement costs, $C(\cdot)$. In particular, for linear costs and zero discounting, purely efficiency considerations suggest that one should expect equal improvements in governance in each round.

Recall that *SSGL* may not obtain under FCC, suggesting that it is time consistency that drives this strong property. *SSGL* in aid can be understood as follows. That $\mathcal{A}_3^* > \mathcal{A}_2^*$ follows due to the reason stated following Proposition 1. Absence of financial slack in period 2 under sequential rationality means the recipient must be incentivized entirely through aid diversion in the last period, so how $\alpha(g_1)\mathcal{A}_1$, $\alpha(g_2)\mathcal{A}_2$ and $\alpha(g_3)\mathcal{A}_3$ compare determines the deviation decision. To avoid any deviation from the aid program, aid diversion in the initial rounds must be dominated by one in the final round, and sequential rationality implies $\alpha(g_2)\mathcal{A}_2 = \alpha(g_3)\mathcal{A}_3$ (see (4) and (5)). So $\alpha(g_1)\mathcal{A}_1 \leq \alpha(g_2)\mathcal{A}_2$, thus $\mathcal{A}_2^* > \mathcal{A}_1^*$ follows. Finally, *SSGL* in governance is a direct implication of there being no interim aid diversion under sequential rationality and $\mathcal{A}_2^* > \mathcal{A}_1^*$. Under full commitment, the possibility of interim aid diversion again causes the *SSGL* property to fail.

An Example. In this example we verify that the three-period problem dominates the two-period problem under PCC. Consider $C(x) = x$. Further, let $\alpha(g) = 1 - g$ whenever $g \leq 1$, and $\alpha(g) = 0$ otherwise. Moreover, let $g_1 = 0$. We first solve for the two-period case. From (4) and (5), and putting $g_2 = \tilde{g}$, we have that

$$\mathcal{L}(\tilde{g}) := \alpha(\tilde{g})(\mathcal{A} - \tilde{g}) = \tilde{g}. \quad (14)$$

Note that the LHS of (14) is convex, initially decreasing and then increasing in \tilde{g} for all $\tilde{g} \leq 1$, with $\mathcal{L}(0) > 0$ and $\mathcal{L}(\tilde{g})$ being constant for all $\tilde{g} \geq 1$. Next, substituting $\alpha(\tilde{g}) = 1 - \tilde{g}$ in (14) and solving, the solution involves (the negative root is chosen as otherwise $\tilde{g} > 1$, so that (14) can not be satisfied):

$$\tilde{g} = 2 + \mathcal{A} - \sqrt{(2 + \mathcal{A})^2 - \mathcal{A}}.$$

For the three-period case, putting $g_3 = g^*$, we obtain

$$(1 - g^*)(\mathcal{A} - g^*) = [1 - (1 - g^*)(\mathcal{A} - g^*)][g^* - (1 - g^*)(\mathcal{A} - g^*)], \quad (15)$$

using the incentive and financial constraints. Comparing (14) and (15), we find that $g^* > \tilde{g}$. This follows as the LHS of both equations have the same functional form, and the RHS of (15) is less than the RHS of (14). ||

■ *Comparing FCC and PCC optimal programs.* The difference between full and partial commitment mechanisms could be due to one of two reasons – whether in the FCC program the second-period financial constraint, (8), binds or the first-period incentive compatibility constraint, (9), binds. When either constraint fails to bind, clearly the FCC program will strictly dominate the PCC program; otherwise the two programs yield an identical aid package. As Proposition 6-2(i) demonstrates (and is confirmed in numerical simulations in supplementary materials), whenever the total aid \mathcal{A} is large, constraint (8) may be slack, which has a simple economic explanation: interim aid diversion helps in improving governance.

8 Some more empirical evidence and a case study

Although this work has been predominantly theoretical in nature, we next try and relate our analysis to the empirical literature on the effect of conditional aid. While there is very little literature that directly examine the effect of conditionality as such (some of this literature is discussed earlier in the introduction), interestingly it provides some compelling, albeit indirect evidence in this respect. Compared to the cold war period, one finds that aid has had a relatively more beneficial effect on various reforms/governance measures during the post cold war period, as argued by Dunning (2004), among others.³⁷ This suggests that conditionality was much more effective in ensuring compliance during the post cold war period, given that the “client states knew that during the Cold War donors would not rescind aid because the other superpower bloc would simply fill the gap” (Dunning (2004)).³⁸ Bermeo (2011), who analyzes the post cold war period 1992–2002, finds that aid from traditional Western donors increases the likelihood of a democratic transition (though aid from oil donors reduces the the probability of such a transition). Turning to the cold war period, Brautigam and Knack (2004) argue that during the 1980s, aid had a significant negative effect on economic reforms. In a similar vein, Heckelman and Knack (2008) find that aid had a negative effect on governance.

We next note several aspects about a major US aid initiative, the *Millennium Challenge Corporation* (or *MCC*), established in 2004. As reported in *The Economist*,³⁹ under MCC

³⁷Dunning (2004) examined the relationship between aid and democracy, comparing the cold war period, in particular 1975 to 1986, with the post cold war period, namely 1987 to 1997, finding that while the relationship was statistically insignificant during the first period, it was positive and significant during the second.

³⁸Wright (2009) argues that during the post-Cold War period conditionality was more meaningful.

³⁹See the report, *Conditional aid*, dated March 2, 2013 (<http://www.economist.com/news/international/21572754-controversial-approach-helping-poor-countries-seems-work-after-all-carrots-all>).

programs aid is conditional on implementation of various closely monitored reforms. MCC states on its website (<https://www.mcc.gov/who-we-fund>): “For a country to be selected as eligible for an MCC assistance program, it must demonstrate a commitment to just and democratic governance, investments in its people and economic freedom as measured by different policy indicators.” Further it states, “When considering a country for a subsequent compact, the Board also takes into consideration evidence of improved scorecard policy performance and a commitment to sectoral reform.”

MCC monitors all aid recipient countries, publishing year-by-year indices of their performance (typically over five years) under the three broad categories of “Economic Freedom,” “Investing in People,” and “Ruling Justly”. Based on these measures, a country can be deemed to have either passed or failed with respect to “Control of Corruption,”⁴⁰ and “Democratic Rights”. A sample tracking of performance is summarized in Table 1 for five countries. Interestingly, many of the ‘governance’ indicators appear to exhibit an increasing pattern. But there are also instances, Indonesia and the Philippines for example, where performance indicators show repeated failures in the category of “Control of Corruption” and yet these countries continued to receive MCC aid (see Tables 1 and 2). This suggests that adherence to strict conditions along important dimensions for future eligibility of aid was not always followed, despite claims to the contrary (see the last paragraph above).

Next, in Table 2, we briefly allude to some empirical facts on the temporal distribution of MCC aid money for ten selected countries.⁴¹ It is interesting that over the first few years of the program, the aid pattern seems to be broadly increasing. Under the assumption that the bulk of the targeted work was done in the first few years, with the later years being mainly devoted to program evaluation etc.,⁴² such a pattern is consistent with the increasing aid pattern that we find when commitment is partial (see Proposition 8).⁴³ This is of course only suggestive, and we are by no means claiming that the reported data vindicates our model. This is even more true given that the underlying aid objectives are often multi-dimensional

⁴⁰“This indicator measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests. It also measures the strength and effectiveness of a country’s policy and institutional framework to prevent and combat corruption.” See <https://www.mcc.gov/who-we-fund/indicator/control-of-corruption-indicator>.

⁴¹See <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work>. Country-by-country information can be accessed at <https://assets.mcc.gov/>. Note that most compacts allow for some flexibility among projects and some diversion of funds from one project to another, so that our focus on aggregate outlay in a country rather than on specific projects is not too unreasonable.

⁴²Nicaragua compact, point 5 of Exhibit A (Notes): “Although most Project Activities will take place from Year 1 through Year 4 (except for roads), the five-year Compact Term will allow additional time to ensure that Project Activities are completed. Monitoring and Evaluation will continue after the completion of the Project Activities.”

⁴³Also, recall from our discussion earlier that the PCC formulation is perhaps more natural when aid is bilateral.

Table 1: Scorecard by MCC

Country	Ruling Justly	FY12	FY13	FY14	FY15	FY16	Pass/Fail
Benin	Political Rights	93%	95%	93%	92%	92%	FAILED in “Control of Corruption” category in FY14
	Civil Liberties	98%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	Freedom of Information	92%	91%	93%	92%	92%	
	Government Effectiveness	80%	85%	82%	83%	81%	
	Control of Corruption	66%	64%	75%	74%	75%	
Georgia	Political Rights	45%	38%	42%	46%	52%	Never FAILED in “Control of Corruption” or “Democratic Rights” category
	Civil Liberties	52%	47%	54%	68%	70%	
	Freedom of Information	50%	47%	54%	61%	67%	
	Government Effectiveness	97%	97%	100%	100%	100%	
	Control of Corruption	62%	72%	77%	79%	89%	
Indonesia	Political Rights	66%	69%	69%	71%	74%	Consistently FAILED in “Control of Corruption” category
	Civil Liberties	48%	44%	46%	43%	48%	
	Freedom of Information	50%	50%	50%	46%	52%	
	Government Effectiveness	66%	66%	58%	61%	78%	
	Control of Corruption	34%	34%	35%	46%	52%	
Madagascar	Political Rights	17%	16%	16%	51%	67%	FAILED “Half Overall” in FY14 & FY15
	Civil Liberties	59%	65%	62%	60%	67%	
	Freedom of Information	39%	42%	38%	49%	56%	
	Government Effectiveness	54%	51%	40%	38%	29%	
	Control of Corruption	58%	58%	51%	49%	56%	
Philippines	Political Rights	95%	95%	71%	66%	54%	FAILED in “Control of Corruption” category in FY12–14
	Civil Liberties	52%	50%	50%	50%	52%	
	Freedom of Information	52%	47%	65%	64%	37%	
	Government Effectiveness	62%	63%	65%	64%	45%	
	Control of Corruption	83%	91%	85%	82%	89%	
	Rule of Law	38%	41%	42%	54%	56%	
	Control of Corruption	24%	19%	46%	61%	56%	

Table 2: Multi-year Aid program under MCC (initial aid normalized to US\$1.00)

Country	Year signed	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5
Benin	2006	1.00	1.95	3.04	2.79	0.71
Georgia	2013	1.00	2.17	2.50	2.37	0.70
Ghana	2006	1.00	1.34	1.99	2.08	0.90
Indonesia	2011	1.00	1.03	1.01	1.12	1.03
Madagascar	2005	1.00	1.80	0.99	0.31	~
Mozambique	2007	1.00	1.16	2.22	2.68	1.91
Nicaragua	2006	1.00	2.03	2.57	2.33	0.65
Philippines	2010	1.00	2.06	2.14	2.43	1.76
Tanzania	2008	1.00 ^a	2.69	3.94	2.90	1.56
Vanuatu	2006	1.00	2.06	2.31	0.25	0.13

^a Year 1 amount for Tanzania is inclusive of CIF (Compact Implementation Funding).

(growth, poverty reduction, governance improvement/reforms, etc.), rather than just focused on governance as under our theoretical framework.

9 Conclusion

An important issue that can be analyzed in an extension of our current setup, but left out for a different paper ([Bag and Roy Chowdhury \(2016\)](#)), is how the volume of aid can be endogenized.⁴⁴ When there is asymmetric information regarding the recipient's ability to pursue reform, conditionality can be used to screen out countries with low reform potential. A typical scheme would let the magnitude of total aid be determined by initial performance on the governance front. That is, conditionality can provide a gateway to selectivity, as identifying the governance levels of countries is key to the provision of selective aid. This is interesting given that the data suggest that selectivity is not that widely practised by donors.⁴⁵ One possible reason could be that donors are not really sure about the future reform potential of the recipient.⁴⁶

Turning to future work, the preceding discussion on MCC suggests some further avenues. Given our discussion of the seeming divergence between aid conditions and the actual implementation of policies, it would be of interest to analyze what are the factors that go into a decision regarding the magnitude of aid, and whether aid is continued or not, and, relatedly, whether repeat aid is provided or not. Consider MCC aid to Georgia, Indonesia and the Philippines (all with agreements starting between 2010 and 2013). Note that Indonesia and the Philippines received much more aid than Georgia despite (a) Georgia having performed much better in the categories of corruption and human rights, and (b) the gross national income per capita of Georgia and Indonesia are not too disparate.⁴⁷ The aid decision involving any country is therefore quite complex and further in-depth empirical analysis of the factors determining such choice should enrich our understanding of the links between aid and reforms.

Our present framework can also be expanded to allow for competing recipients. In such a general multilateral aid setting additional issues of interest arise. First, a donor may

⁴⁴The question was raised by one of the referees.

⁴⁵See [Alesina and Weder \(2002\)](#), and [Dollar and Levin \(2004\)](#).

⁴⁶[Rodrik \(1989\)](#) pointed out why, when reforms can be aborted or reversed, the government may have to engage in excessive reforms to signal its type. In contrast, our formulation assumes reforms to be permanent.

⁴⁷In fact, Georgia's per-capita gross national incomes (GNI) during FY12-FY16 are \$2690, \$2860, \$3280, \$3570 and \$3720 respectively, whereas similar figures for Indonesia and the Philippines are, respectively \$2580, \$2940, \$3420, \$3580, \$3650, and \$2050, \$2210, \$2470, \$3270, \$3440. Thus while relatively much lower per-capita GNI of the Philippines could be one reason for greater aid, income figures for Indonesia and Georgia are very similar.

have goals other than, or in addition to, governance, e.g. developmental/welfare goals. In addition, the donor’s objective may differ from one country to another – governance improvement and reform in one, and development objectives, such as the eradication of child malnutrition, disease control and the likes, in another. But even without such complexities, the single-recipient case poses interesting issues and theoretical subtleties that, moreover, have interesting implications for the empirical and policy debate on conditionality. Our work should be viewed as a necessary first step in understanding and analyzing the additional issues that arise in a more general setting.⁴⁸

A Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1. First we claim that in the optimal program either (2) or (3) must hold with equality. If not, it is possible to increase g_2 slightly and still satisfy the incentive and financial constraints. But this would improve governance at $t = 2$, a contradiction.

Next we show that both constraints, (2) and (3), must bind. We do this in two steps.

Step 1. First suppose that (2) binds, while (3) does not. Then construct another program $(\mathcal{A}'_1, \mathcal{A}'_2)$ such that $\mathcal{A}'_1 = \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_1 - \epsilon$ and $\mathcal{A}'_2 = \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2 + \epsilon$, $\epsilon > 0$. Given $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_1 > 0$ (from Lemma 1), such a program exists for ϵ small. Moreover, for ϵ small, both the constraints hold with strict inequality. Thus g_2 can be increased slightly.

Step 2. Next suppose that (3) binds, while (2) does not. Then construct another program $(\mathcal{A}'_1, \mathcal{A}'_2)$ such that $\mathcal{A}'_1 = \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_1 + \epsilon$ and $\mathcal{A}'_2 = \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2 - \epsilon$, $\epsilon > 0$. Given $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2 > 0$ (from Lemma 1), such a program exists for ϵ small. Moreover, for ϵ small, both the constraints hold with strict inequality. Thus g_2 can be increased slightly.

Parts (i) and (ii) follow from the fact that both the financial and incentive constraints bind in the optimal solution. For a proof of (iii), observe that since both the constraints bind we have:

$$\frac{\Delta \cdot \alpha(\tilde{g}_2)}{\alpha(g_1)} = \frac{\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_1}{\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2}.$$

The result now follows as $\Delta < 1$, $\tilde{g}_2 > g_1$ (from Lemma 1), and $\alpha(g)$ is strictly decreasing. Q.E.D.

⁴⁸A related work is Carter et al. (2015), who analyze a problem involving multiple aid recipients where a single donor chooses a dynamic aid plan to maximize a weighted sum of the recipient countries’ welfare. The focus is on the effect of differential aid absorption ability of the recipients, rather than aid diversion or aid conditionality.

Proof of Proposition 3. (i) The proof relies on the following steps.

Step 1. Starting from any initial g_1 , take the optimal two-period incentives $(\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_1, \tilde{g}_2; \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2)$ where $(\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_1, \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2) \gg 0$ and $\tilde{g}_2 > g_1$ and plug these values into the IC and financial constraints for the three-period problem. That is, we set $\mathcal{A}_1 = \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_1$, $\mathcal{A}_2 = \mathcal{A} - \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_1 = \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2$, $\mathcal{A}_3 = 0$, $g_2 = g_3 = \tilde{g}_2$. Now check that all four constraints in the three-period problem are satisfied:

$$(7) \quad \delta \frac{\alpha(g_3)\mathcal{A}_3}{\alpha(g_2)} \geq C(g_3 - g_2)$$

$$\text{i.e.,} \quad \delta \mathcal{A}_3 = 0 = C(g_3 - g_2) \quad (\text{by } g_3 = g_2, \mathcal{A}_3 = 0);$$

$$(8) \quad \mathcal{A}_2 \geq C(g_3 - g_2)$$

$$\text{i.e.,} \quad \mathcal{A}_2 > 0 = C(g_3 - g_2) \quad (\text{by } g_3 = g_2, \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2 > 0, \text{ and } \mathcal{A}_2 = \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2);$$

$$(9) \quad \delta \alpha(g_2)[\mathcal{A}_2 - C(g_3 - g_2)] + \delta \alpha(g_3)\mathcal{A}_3 > \alpha(g_1)C(g_2 - g_1)$$

$$\text{i.e.,} \quad \delta \alpha(g_2)\mathcal{A}_2 > \alpha(g_1)C(g_2 - g_1) \quad (\text{by } \mathcal{A}_2 > 0, \Delta < \delta, g_3 = g_2, \mathcal{A}_3 = 0, \text{ and (4)});$$

$$(10) \quad \mathcal{A}_1 = C(g_2 - g_1) \quad (\text{true by (5)}).$$

Starting from the above inequalities, next we will construct another program with a higher g_3 where all the inequalities are satisfied.

Step 2. Reduce \mathcal{A}_2 by ϵ to \mathcal{A}'_2 , and increase \mathcal{A}_3 by ϵ to \mathcal{A}'_3 , where ϵ is sufficiently small. Thus from the above set of inequalities we can write, for ϵ small,

$$\delta \alpha(g_3)\mathcal{A}'_3 > 0 = \alpha(g_2)C(g_3 - g_2) \quad (7.1)$$

$$\mathcal{A}'_2 > 0 = C(g_3 - g_2) \quad (8.1)$$

$$\delta \alpha(g_2)[\mathcal{A}'_2 - C(g_3 - g_2)] + \delta^2 \alpha(g_3)\mathcal{A}'_3 > \alpha(g_1)C(g_2 - g_1) \quad (9.1)$$

$$\mathcal{A}_1 = C(g_2 - g_1). \quad (10.1)$$

Step 3. Lower g_2 slightly to g'_2 while maintaining g_3 at the original g_2 -value, to obtain:

$$\delta \alpha(g_3)\mathcal{A}'_3 > \alpha(g_2)C(g_3 - g'_2) \quad (7.2)$$

$$\mathcal{A}'_2 > C(g_3 - g'_2) \quad (8.2)$$

$$\delta \alpha(g'_2)[\mathcal{A}'_2 - C(g_3 - g'_2)] + \delta^2 \alpha(g_3)\mathcal{A}'_3 > \alpha(g_1)C(g'_2 - g_1) \quad (9.2)$$

$$\mathcal{A}_1 > C(g'_2 - g_1). \quad (10.2)$$

The inequalities follow from continuity of expressions (on both sides of inequalities) in g_2 .

Step 4. Let us now increase g_3 slightly to $g_2 + \epsilon'$. Since ϵ' is very small and the expressions on both sides of (7.2)–(10.2) are continuous in g_3 , all the inequalities will continue to be maintained, implying $g_2 + \epsilon'$ is achievable under the three-period program, thus proving the

claim.

(ii) To establish gradualism first we show that $\hat{g}_3 > \hat{g}_2$, then we eliminate the possibility that $\hat{g}_2 = g_1$.

Suppose, to the contrary, $\hat{g}_3 = \hat{g}_2$. If $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_3 = 0$, it is a two-period program which is not optimal as shown in part (i). So let $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_3 > 0$ and construct an alternative program $(\mathcal{A}'_1, g'_2; \mathcal{A}'_2, g'_3; \mathcal{A}'_3)$ such that

$$\mathcal{A}'_1 = \hat{\mathcal{A}}_1, \mathcal{A}'_2 = \hat{\mathcal{A}}_2 + \hat{\mathcal{A}}_3, \mathcal{A}'_3 = 0, g'_2 = \hat{g}_2, g'_3 = \hat{g}_3.$$

This is clearly feasible (i.e., satisfy (6)–(10)) but effectively a two-period program which, by part (i), can be strictly dominated by a three-period program. Hence, $\hat{g}_3 > \hat{g}_2$.

Now consider the possibility $\hat{g}_2 = g_1$. If $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_1 = 0$, effectively it is a two-period program which, by part (i), cannot be optimal. So let $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_1 > 0$. Now, starting from this one, construct another program $(\mathcal{A}'_1, g'_2; \mathcal{A}'_2, g'_3; \mathcal{A}'_3)$ such that

$$\mathcal{A}'_1 = 0, \mathcal{A}'_2 = \hat{\mathcal{A}}_1 + \hat{\mathcal{A}}_2, \mathcal{A}'_3 = \hat{\mathcal{A}}_3, g'_2 = \hat{g}_2, g'_3 = \hat{g}_3.$$

Again, this is effectively a feasible two-period program, which can be strictly dominated by a three-period program. Hence it must be that $\hat{g}_2 > g_1$.

We can therefore conclude that the optimal three-period program must exhibit gradualism: $\hat{g}_3 > \hat{g}_2 > g_1$. Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 5. (i) In the proof of Proposition 4(iii), the key step was to show that $Z'(0) < 0$. We follow the same method here.

Under Assumption 2, we have

$$Z'(0) \equiv Z'(\epsilon)|_{\epsilon=0} = C'(\hat{g}_2 - g_1) \left[1 - \frac{\alpha(\hat{g}_2)}{\alpha(\hat{g}_3)} \right] + \frac{\alpha'(\hat{g}_2)}{\alpha(\hat{g}_3)} C(\hat{g}_3 - \hat{g}_2) < 0,$$

given that $\hat{g}_3 > \hat{g}_2$ (by Proposition 3), $C(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing and $\alpha(g)$ is strictly decreasing. The rest of the argument is the same as in Proposition 4(iii).

(ii) We have

$$\alpha(g_1)C(\hat{g}_2 - g_1) = \alpha(g_1)\hat{\mathcal{A}}_1 = \delta^2\alpha(\hat{g}_3)\hat{\mathcal{A}}_3 + \delta\alpha(\hat{g}_2)\hat{\mathcal{A}}_2 - \delta\alpha(\hat{g}_2)C(\hat{g}_3 - \hat{g}_2) = \delta\alpha(\hat{g}_2)\hat{\mathcal{A}}_2,$$

where the first equality follows from (10) binding, the second from (9) binding, and the last one from (7) binding. Given that (i) $\hat{g}_2 > \hat{g}_1$ (Proposition 3) and (ii) $\alpha(g)$ is strictly decreasing, this in turn yields that $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_1 < \hat{\mathcal{A}}_2$.

Finally, from the second equality above we have $\alpha(g_1)\hat{\mathcal{A}}_1 \geq \alpha(\hat{g}_3)\hat{\mathcal{A}}_3$, since $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_2 \geq C(\hat{g}_3 - \hat{g}_2)$. Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 6.

1. We first claim that g_3^* is increasing in \mathcal{A} . In order to prove this claim it is sufficient to prove that $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ and $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ are both increasing in \mathcal{A} . The argument is as follows. First, consider the case where $i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A}) < f(g_2^*, \mathcal{A})$. In that case $g_3^* = i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A})$. Thus in this case it is sufficient to show that $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ is increasing in \mathcal{A} . Next suppose that $i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A}) > f(g_2^*, \mathcal{A})$, so that $g_3^* = f(g_2^*, \mathcal{A})$. Let $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ and $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ both be increasing in \mathcal{A} . We divide the effect of a change in \mathcal{A} into two parts. First consider the effect of an increase in \mathcal{A} on $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$, keeping $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ fixed. As \mathcal{A} increases, $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ shifts up, so that g_2 increases and consequently g_3^* increases (given that $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ is increasing in g_2 and $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ intersects $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ from above). Next consider the effect of an increase in \mathcal{A} on $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$, keeping $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ fixed at the new value of \mathcal{A} . As \mathcal{A} increases, g_2 decreases but g_3^* increases (since $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ is decreasing in g_2 and $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ intersects $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ from above).

We next prove that $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ and $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ are both increasing in \mathcal{A} . Invoking the implicit function theorem,

$$\frac{\partial f(g_2, \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathcal{A}} = -\frac{\frac{\partial F(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathcal{A}}}{\frac{\partial F(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial g_3}}.$$

Hence $\frac{\partial f(g_2, \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathcal{A}} > 0$, since $\frac{\partial F(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathcal{A}} = 1$ and $\frac{\partial F(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial g_3} < 0$ (from part (i) of Lemma 2).

Similarly,

$$\frac{\partial i(g_2, \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathcal{A}} = -\frac{\frac{\partial I(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathcal{A}}}{\frac{\partial I(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial g_3}} > 0,$$

since $\frac{\partial I(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathcal{A}} = 1$ and $\frac{\partial I(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial g_3} = -\frac{\alpha(g_2)C'(g_3 - g_2)}{\delta\alpha(g_3)} + \frac{\alpha(g_2)C(g_3 - g_2)\alpha'(g_3)}{\delta(\alpha(g_3))^2} < 0$.

Clearly the result holds irrespective of whether there is interim aid diversion, or not.

We next argue that g_3^* is increasing in δ . As in the preceding case, it is sufficient to show that $f(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ and $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ are both increasing in δ . By the implicit function theorem,

$$\frac{\partial f(g_2, \mathcal{A})}{\partial \delta} = -\frac{\frac{\partial F(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial \delta}}{\frac{\partial F(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial g_3}}.$$

Hence $\frac{\partial f(g_2, \mathcal{A})}{\partial \delta} > 0$, since $\frac{\partial F(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial \delta} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial F(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial g_3} < 0$ (from part (i) of Lemma 2).

Similarly, $\frac{\partial i(g_2, \mathcal{A})}{\partial \delta} = -\frac{\frac{\partial I(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial \delta}}{\frac{\partial I(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial g_3}} > 0$, since $\frac{\partial I(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial \delta} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial I(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial g_3} < 0$ (see verification of Lemma 3(ii)).

Clearly, the result holds irrespective of whether there is interim aid diversion, or not.

2. Recall that interim aid diversion happens whenever $i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A}) < f(g_2^*, \mathcal{A})$ (see Lemma 3(ii)). Thus the claim in part (i) is equivalent to showing that if $i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A}) < f(g_2^*, \mathcal{A})$ for some \mathcal{A} , then the inequality holds for all higher values of aid. Formally, we need to show that

$$\frac{dF(g_2^*(\mathcal{A}), i(g_2^*(\mathcal{A}), \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A})}{d\mathcal{A}} \geq 0.$$

Further, this also establishes the claim in part (ii).

Next note that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dF(g_2^*(\mathcal{A}), i(g_2^*(\mathcal{A}), \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A})}{d\mathcal{A}} &= \frac{\partial F(g_2^*, g_3^*; \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathcal{A}} + \frac{\partial F(g_2^*, g_3^*; \mathcal{A})}{\partial g_2^*} \frac{dg_2^*}{d\mathcal{A}} \\ &\quad + \frac{\partial F(g_2^*, g_3^*; \mathcal{A})}{\partial g_3^*} \frac{\partial i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathcal{A}} + \frac{\partial F(g_2^*, g_3^*; \mathcal{A})}{\partial g_3^*} \frac{\partial i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A})}{\partial g_2^*} \frac{dg_2^*}{d\mathcal{A}} \\ &= 1 + \frac{\partial F}{\partial g_2^*} \frac{dg_2^*}{d\mathcal{A}} + \frac{\partial F(g_2^*, g_3^*; \mathcal{A})}{\partial g_3^*} \frac{\partial i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathcal{A}}, \end{aligned}$$

since $\frac{\partial i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A})}{\partial g_2^*} = 0$ (recall (13)) and $\frac{\partial F(g_2^*, g_3^*; \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathcal{A}} = 1$.

Next consider the term $\frac{dg_2^*}{d\mathcal{A}}$. Differentiating both sides of

$$I(g_2, i(g_2, \mathcal{A}), \mathcal{A}) \equiv 0$$

with respect to g_2 and evaluating $\frac{\partial i(g_2, \mathcal{A})}{\partial g_2}$ at $g_2 = g_2^*$ yields:

$$\frac{\partial i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A})}{\partial g_2^*} = -\frac{I_1(g_2^*, g_3^*; \mathcal{A})}{I_2(g_2^*, g_3^*; \mathcal{A})} = 0;$$

similarly obtain: $\frac{\partial i}{\partial \mathcal{A}} = -\frac{I_3}{I_2} = -\frac{1}{I_2} > 0$, given that $I_3 = 1$ and $I_2 < 0$.

Next, totally differentiating $I_1(g_2^*, i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) = 0$, we have

$$I_{11} dg_2^* + I_{12} \left[\underbrace{\frac{\partial i}{\partial g_2}}_{=0} dg_2^* + \frac{\partial i}{\partial \mathcal{A}} d\mathcal{A} \right] + \underbrace{I_{13}}_{=0} d\mathcal{A} = 0,$$

or, $\frac{dg_2^*}{d\mathcal{A}} = -\frac{I_{12} \frac{\partial i}{\partial \mathcal{A}}}{I_{11}} = \frac{I_{12}}{I_{11}} \frac{1}{I_2} > 0$. (by parts (ii) and (v) of Lemma 2 and Assumption 3(i))

Hence,

$$\frac{dF(g_2^*(\mathcal{A}), i(g_2^*(\mathcal{A}), \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A})}{d\mathcal{A}} = 1 - \frac{\partial F}{\partial g_2^*} \frac{I_{12}}{I_{11}} \frac{\partial i}{\partial \mathcal{A}} + \frac{\partial F}{\partial g_3^*} \frac{\partial i}{\partial \mathcal{A}} = 1 - \frac{F_1}{I_2} \left[-\frac{I_{12}}{I_{11}} + \frac{F_2}{F_1} \right] > 0,$$

given that (i) $I_2 < 0$, (ii) $I_{12} > 0$, $I_{11} < 0$ and $\left| \frac{I_{12}(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{I_{11}(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})} \right| > \left| \frac{F_2(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})}{F_1(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})} \right|$ (by hypothesis), and (iii) $F_1 > 0$ given Assumption 3(i). Q.E.D.

Proposition 7 is a shortened version of the following lemma.

Lemma A.1. *Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then the optimal PCC program can be characterized as follows:*

- (i) Constraints (7), (8), and (10) all bind.
- (ii) $\alpha(g_1)\mathcal{A}_1^* \leq \delta^2\alpha(g_3^*)\mathcal{A}_3^* = \delta\alpha(g_2^*)\mathcal{A}_2^*$, which implies that $\mathcal{A}_3^* \geq \mathcal{A}_2^* \geq \mathcal{A}_1^*$.
- (iii) $g_3^* - g_2^* \geq g_2^* - g_1$.
- (iv) Period 1 incentive compatibility constraint (9) will bind.
- (v) $\mathcal{A}_1^* > 0$.
- (vi) $g_2^* - g_1 > 0$.

The proof of this lemma is included in supplementary materials.

Proof of Proposition 8. (i) From Lemma A.1, $0 < \alpha(g_1)\mathcal{A}_1^* \leq \alpha(g_2^*)\mathcal{A}_2^* = \delta\alpha(g_3^*)\mathcal{A}_3^*$. It must therefore be that $\mathcal{A}_1^*, \mathcal{A}_2^*, \mathcal{A}_3^* \gg 0$. And since $\mathcal{A}_1^* = C(g_2^* - g_1)$ and $\mathcal{A}_2^* = C(g_3^* - g_2^*)$, it follows that $g_3^* > g_2^* > g_1$ (apply the fact that $C(0) = 0$ and $C(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing). Given that $\alpha(g_1)\mathcal{A}_1^* \leq \alpha(g_2^*)\mathcal{A}_2^* = \delta\alpha(g_3^*)\mathcal{A}_3^*$, this in turn implies that $\mathcal{A}_3^* > \mathcal{A}_2^* > \mathcal{A}_1^*$.

(ii) The result follows from $\mathcal{A}_2^* = C(g_3^* - g_2^*) > \mathcal{A}_1^* = C(g_2^* - g_1)$ and the result above that $\mathcal{A}_2^* > \mathcal{A}_1^* > 0$, given that $C(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing.

(iii) Suppose not so that $\tilde{g}_2 \geq g_3^*$, where \tilde{g}_2 is the maximal implementable g in the two-period setup. Now consider the following three-period program: $(\mathcal{A}_1 = 0, g_2 = g_1; \mathcal{A}_2 = \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_1, g_3 = \tilde{g}_2; \mathcal{A}_3 = \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2)$, where $(\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_1, \tilde{g}_2; \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2)$ is the optimal two-period program. Given the initial governance level g_1 and first-period aid and target governance $(\mathcal{A}_1 = 0, g_2 = g_1)$, clearly $(\mathcal{A}_2 = \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_1, g_3 = \tilde{g}_2; \mathcal{A}_3 = \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2)$ is time consistent in the subgame starting in period 2. Stepping back to period 1 it is easy to see that the three-period program $(\mathcal{A}_1 = 0, g_2 = g_1; \mathcal{A}_2 = \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_1, g_3 = \tilde{g}_2; \mathcal{A}_3 = \tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2)$ is feasible as per Definition 2. But then it cannot be optimal in the three-period program as it fails to satisfy the optimality requirement $g_3^* > g_2^* > g_1$ as shown in part (i). This contradicts our hypothesis that $g_3^* \leq \tilde{g}_2$. Q.E.D.

References

- Adam, C.S. and S.A. O’Connell**, “Aid, taxation and development in Sub-Saharan Africa,” *Economics & Politics*, 1999, 11, 225–253.
- Alesina, A. and B. Weder**, “Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid?,” *American Economic Review*, 2002, 92, 1126–1137.
- Azam, J-P. and J-J. Laffont**, “Contracting for aid,” *Journal of Development Economics*, 2003, 70, 25–58.
- Bag, P.K. and P. Roy Chowdhury**, “Aid selectivity, conditional aid and reforms,” Prelim. draft (in preparation) 2016.
- Bakoup, F.**, “Promoting economic reform in developing countries: Rethinking budgetary aid?,” Working paper no. 167, African Development Bank Group (<http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/country-economic-thematic-review-meeting-promoting-economic-reforms-in-developing-countries-rethinking-budgetary-aid-11554/>), 2013.
- Banerjee, A.V.**, “Making aid work: How to fight global poverty effectively,” in *Making Aid Work*, Boston Review/MIT Press (also available at <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/4741/MakingAidWork.pdf>), 2007.
- **and R. He**, “Making aid work,” in *W. Easterly (Ed.), Reinventing foreign aid*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2008, pp. 44–92.
- Bates, R.H.**, *Markets and states in tropical Africa: The political basis of agricultural policies*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1981.
- , *Governments and agricultural markets in Africa*, in D.G. Johnson and G.E. Schuh, eds. *The Role of Markets in the World Food Economy*, West View Press, Boulder, CO., 1983.
- Bermeo, S.**, “Foreign aid and regime change: A role for donor intent,” *World Development*, 2011, 39, 2021–2031.
- Bond, E.W. and J.H. Park**, “Gradualism in trade agreements with asymmetric countries,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 2002, 59, 367–397.
- Boone, P.**, “Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid,” *European Economic Review*, 1996, 40, 289–329.

- Brautigam, D. and S. Knack**, “Foreign aid, institutions, and governance in sub-Saharan Africa,” *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 2004, *52*, 255–285.
- Burnside, C. and D. Dollar**, “Aid, policies and growth,” *American Economic Review*, 2000, *90*, 847–868.
- **and** –, “Aid, policies, and growth: Reply,” *American Economic Review*, 2004, *94*, 781–784.
- Carter, P., F. Postel-Vinay, and J. Temple**, “Dynamic aid allocation,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2015, *95*.
- Chisik, R.**, “Gradualism in free trade agreements: a theoretical justification,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2003, *59*, 367–397.
- Collier, P.**, “Africa’s external economic relations 1960-1990,” *African Affairs*, 1990, pp. 339–356.
- Conway, P.**, “Endogenous IMF conditionality: Theoretical and empirical implications,” Department of Economics, University of North Carolina, Working paper, (<http://www.unc.edu/~pconway/dload/ec.conway.pdf>), 2003.
- Cordella, T., G. Dell’Ariccia, and K.M. Kletzer**, “Conditional aid, sovereign debt, and debt relief,” Mimeo, UCL, Santa Cruz 2003.
- Dollar, D. and J. Svensson**, “What explains the success or failure of structural adjustment programs?,” Policy Research Working Paper, no. 1938, 1998.
- **and V. Levin**, “The increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 1984-2002,” The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3299, (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=610344), 2004.
- Drazen, A.**, *Political economy in macroeconomics*, Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Dunning, T.**, “Conditioning the effects of aid: Cold war politics, donor credibility, and democracy in Africa,” *International Organization*, 2004, *58*, 409–423.
- Easterly, W.**, “Can foreign aid buy growth,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2003, *17*, 23–48.
- , **R. Levine, and D. Roodman**, “New data, new doubts: A comment on Burnside and Dollar’s ‘Aid, policies, and growth’ (2000),” *American Economic Review*, 2004, *94*, 774–780.

- EC**, “Communication from the commission to the European parliament, the council, the European economic and social committee of the regions: The future approach to the EU budget support to third countries. Brussels, 13.10.2011 COM(2011) 638 final,” European Commission 2011.
- Federico, G.**, “Aid and policies under weak donor conditionality,” *Journal of African Economies*, 2004, 13, 395–416.
- Guitian, M.**, “Conditionality: Past, present, future,” *Staff Papers: International Monetary Fund*, 1995, 42, 792–835.
- Heckelman, J. and S. Knack**, “Foreign aid and market-liberalizing reform,” *Economica*, 2008, 75, 524–548.
- Kanbur, R.**, “Aid conditionality and debt in Africa,” in Finn Tarp (Ed.), *Foreign aid and development: Lessons learnt and directions for the future*, Routledge Press, 2000.
- Kapur, D. and R. Webb**, “Governance-related conditionalities of the international financial institutions,” New York and Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, G-24 Discussion Paper Series 6, (<https://ideas.repec.org/p/unc/g24pap/6.html>), 2000.
- Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and P. Zoido-Lobaton**, “Governance matters,” Policy Research Working Paper 2196, The World Bank, (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=188568), 1999.
- Kletzer, K.M.**, “Aid and sanctions,” Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UCL, SC 2005.
- Klimenko, M., G. Ramey, and J. Watson**, “Recurrent trade agreements and the value of external enforcement,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2008, 74, 475–489.
- Koeberle, S.**, “Should policy based lending still involve conditionality?,” *The World Bank Research Observer*, 2003, 18, 249–273.
- Lockwood, B. and J.P. Thomas**, “Gradualism and irreversibility,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 2002, 69, 339–356.
- Marx, L. and S. Matthews**, “Dynamic voluntary contributions to a public project,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 1998, 67, 327–358.

- McGuire, M.C. and M. Jr. Olson**, “The economics of autocracy and majority rule: The invisible hand and the use of force,” *Journal of Economic Literature*, 1996, 34, 72–96.
- Morrissey, O.**, “Political economy dimensions of economic policy reforms,” in M. McGillivray and O. Morrissey (eds.), *Evaluating Economic Liberalisation*, London: McMillan, 1999.
- , “Implementation and outcomes of African trade policy reforms in the 1990s,” in D. Belshaw and I. Livingstone eds., *Renewing Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policy, Performance and Prospects*, London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 339–353.
- , “Alternatives to conditionality in policy based lending,” Mimeo, Development Policy Forum, Paris 2004a.
- , “Conditionality and aid effectiveness re-evaluated,” *World Economy*, 2004b, 27, 153–171.
- Mosley, P.**, “A theory of conditionality,” in P. Mosley, ed., *Development Finance and Policy Reform: Essays in the Theory and Practice of Conditionality in Less Developed Countries*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992.
- , **J. Harrigan, and J. Toye**, *Aid and Power*, Vol. 1, London: Routledge, 1995.
- Murshed, M. and S. Sen**, “Aid conditionality and military expenditure reduction in developing countries: Models of asymmetric information,” *The Economic Journal*, 1995, 105, 498–505.
- Neher, D.V.**, “Staged financing: An agency perspective,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 1999, 66, 255–274.
- OED**, “2003 Annual review of development effectiveness: The effectiveness of Bank support for policy reform,” in Washington DC: World Bank Operations Effectiveness Department (https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/arde_2003.pdf), 2004.
- Rodrik, D.**, “Promises, promises: Credible policy reform via signaling,” *The Economic Journal*, 1989, 99, 756–772.
- Sandbrook, R.**, “The state and economic stagnation in tropical Africa,” *World Development*, 1986, 14, 319–332.
- Santiso, C.**, “Good governance and aid effectiveness: The World Bank and conditionality,” *The Georgetown Public Policy Review*, 2001a, 7, 1–22.

- , “International co-operation for democracy and good governance: Moving toward a second generation?,” *European Journal of Development Research*, 2001b, 13, 154–180.
- Scholl, A.**, “Aid effectiveness and limited enforceable conditionality,” *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 2009, 12, 377–391.
- Staiger, R.W.**, “A theory of gradual trade liberalization,” in J. Levinsohn, A.V. Deardorff and R.M. Stern (Eds.), *New Directions in Trade Theory*, University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor, MI, 1995, pp. 249–284.
- **and G. Tabellini**, “Discretionary trade policy and excessive protection,” *American Economic Review*, 1987, 77, 823–837.
- Svensson, J.**, “Reforming donor institutions: Aid tournaments,” World Bank Working Paper, 1998.
- , “Aid, growth, and democracy,” *Economics and Politics*, 1999, 11, 275–297.
- , “Foreign aid and rent seeking,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2000a, 51, 437–461.
- , “When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality,” *Journal of Development Economics*, 2000b, 61, 61–84.
- , “Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?,” *Journal of Development Economics*, 2003, 70, 381–402.
- Temple, J.R.W.**, “Aid and conditionality,” in D. Rodrik and M. Rosenzweig (Eds.), *Handbook of Development Economics*, 2010, 5, 4415–4518.
- Watson, J.**, “Starting small and renegotiation,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, 1999, 85, 52–90.
- , “Starting small and commitment,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, 2002, 38, 176–199.
- Wright, J.**, “How foreign aid can foster democratization in authoritarian regimes,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 2009, 53, 552–571.

B Supplementary materials

Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that contrary to the claim in part (ii) of this lemma, $\tilde{g}_2 = g_1$. We shall argue that in that case it is possible to construct a feasible aid–governance scheme with a higher level of governance. Fixing $\mathcal{A} > \epsilon_1 > 0$, $\epsilon_2 > 0$, by the continuity of $C(g_2 - g_1)$ and $\alpha(g_2) - \alpha(g_1)$ we can choose $g'_2 - g_1 = \eta > 0$ appropriately small such that $0 < C(\eta) < \epsilon_1$ and $\alpha(g_1) - \alpha(g'_2) < \epsilon_2$.

Now letting $\mathcal{A}'_1 = \epsilon_1$, $\mathcal{A}'_2 = \mathcal{A} - \epsilon_1$, we can write

$$\Delta \cdot \frac{\alpha(g'_2)}{\alpha(g_1)} \frac{\mathcal{A} - \epsilon_1}{\epsilon_1} > \Delta \left[\frac{\alpha(g_1) - \epsilon_2}{\alpha(g_1)} \right] \left[\frac{\mathcal{A} - \epsilon_1}{\epsilon_1} \right] = \Delta \left[1 - \frac{\epsilon_2}{\alpha(g_1)} \right] \left[\frac{\mathcal{A} - \epsilon_1}{\epsilon_1} \right] > 1,$$

where the last inequality holds whenever ϵ_1 and ϵ_2 are sufficiently small.

Hence, $\Delta \cdot \alpha(g'_2)(\mathcal{A} - \epsilon_1) > \alpha(g_1)\epsilon_1 > \alpha(g_1)C(g'_2 - g_1)$, satisfying the incentive compatibility condition (2). Finally, by construction, $\mathcal{A}'_1 > C(\eta) = C(g'_2 - g_1)$, thus satisfying the financial constraint (3). Thus, we have constructed a feasible aid package $(\mathcal{A}'_1, \mathcal{A}'_2)$ leading to $g'_2 = g_1 + \eta$ that dominates the initial level of governance g_1 . A contradiction.

Next given that $\tilde{g}_2 > g_1$, from (2) we have $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_2 > 0$, and from (3) we have $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}_1 > 0$ (using the fact that $C(0) = 0$ and $C(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing). Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 4. (i) Suppose period 1 financial constraint does not bind, so (10) holds with strict inequality. Then \mathcal{A}_1 can be reduced slightly, and \mathcal{A}_2 and \mathcal{A}_3 can be increased slightly so that \mathcal{A}_1 , \mathcal{A}_2 and \mathcal{A}_3 still sum up to \mathcal{A} . This relaxes (7), (8) and (9), so that g_3 can be increased slightly, given that $\alpha(g)$ and $C(\cdot)$ are continuous functions. This yields a contradiction.

Suppose period 2 incentive constraint is not binding, so (7) holds with strict inequality. Now take away some $\zeta > 0$ from $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_3$ such that (7) continues to hold, and add this ζ to $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_2$ such that both (8) and (9) hold with strict inequalities (strict inequality in (9) follows, since $\hat{g}_3 > \hat{g}_2$, which in turn follows from Proposition 3, implies $\zeta\alpha(\hat{g}_2) > \zeta\alpha(\hat{g}_3)$). Next take away some $\epsilon > 0$ from $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_2 + \zeta$ (where $\epsilon < \zeta$) and add this to $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_1$ such that conditions (8) and (9) continue to be satisfied (given that both were satisfied with strict inequalities due to ζ transfer), and condition (10) now holds with strict inequality. As a result, the solutions (\hat{g}_3, \hat{g}_2) are unaffected and yet period 1 financial constraint is *not* binding, contradicting the fact that at the optimal outcome (10) binds (as shown above).

(ii) Suppose not, so that both (8) and (9) hold with strict inequality. Then take away a small $\eta > 0$ from $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_2$ and add it to $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_1$ such that (8) and (9) continue to be satisfied and condition (10) holds with strict inequality. Again, the first part of (i) is contradicted.

(iii) Suppose to the contrary that (9) does not bind. Then, given (i) and (ii) in this Proposition, the donor's problem can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & g_3, & \text{subject to} \\ \delta \mathcal{A}_3 &= \frac{\alpha(g_2)}{\alpha(g_3)} C(g_3 - g_2), & (7.3) \end{aligned}$$

$$\mathcal{A}_2 = C(g_3 - g_2), \quad (8.3)$$

$$0 < -\alpha(g_1)C(g_2 - g_1) + \delta\alpha(g_2)[\mathcal{A}_2 - C(g_3 - g_2)] + \delta^2\alpha(g_3)\mathcal{A}_3, \quad (9.3)$$

$$\mathcal{A}_1 = C(g_2 - g_1). \quad (10.3)$$

Having solved the above problem, below we will return to our (hat) notations for the optimal incentives under the FCC program.

Let us increase g_2 to $\hat{g}_2 + \epsilon$, $\epsilon > 0$ small. Then define

$$Z(\epsilon) = \frac{\alpha(\hat{g}_2 + \epsilon)}{\alpha(\hat{g}_3)} C(\hat{g}_3 - \hat{g}_2 - \epsilon) + C(\hat{g}_2 + \epsilon - g_1).$$

Thus $Z(\cdot)$ is the sum of the RHS of (7.3) and (10.3), taking the increase in g_2 into account. Next observe that

$$Z'(0) \equiv Z'(\epsilon)|_{\epsilon=0} = -\frac{\alpha(\hat{g}_2)}{\alpha(\hat{g}_3)} C'(\hat{g}_3 - \hat{g}_2) + C'(\hat{g}_2 - g_1) + \frac{\alpha'(\hat{g}_2)}{\alpha(\hat{g}_3)} C(\hat{g}_3 - \hat{g}_2).$$

Given that $C(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing and weakly convex, $\alpha(g)$ is strictly decreasing (Assumption 1), $\hat{g}_3 \geq \hat{g}_2$, and $\hat{g}_3 - \hat{g}_2 \geq \hat{g}_2 - g_1$ (by hypothesis), it follows that

$$Z'(0) < 0. \quad (B.1)$$

Next note that for ϵ sufficiently small, conditions (7), (8), and (9) will all hold with strict inequality; however, (10) will be violated.⁴⁹ We next argue that $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2, \mathcal{A}_3$ can be adjusted in such a way that all the required weak inequalities will hold (including equalities).

Let X', X, Y respectively denote the absolute values of the changes in the RHS of (7.3), (8.3), and (10.3) respectively as a result of increasing g_2 to $\hat{g}_2 + \epsilon$. Given (B.1), for ϵ small,

$$X' > Y.$$

⁴⁹Here while we refer to the original feasibility constraints in section 4, the reader may as well think in terms of (7.3)–(10.3), for ease of visualization.

Next consider $\mathcal{A}'_1, \mathcal{A}'_2, \mathcal{A}'_3$ such that

$$\mathcal{A}'_1 = \hat{\mathcal{A}}_1 + Y, \quad \mathcal{A}'_2 = \hat{\mathcal{A}}_2, \quad \text{and} \quad \mathcal{A}'_3 = \hat{\mathcal{A}}_3 - Y.$$

Observe that with the above reallocation of the aid budget (from period 3 to period 1), all the inequalities in (7), (8), (9) will continue to hold strictly (as after the g_2 increase), and now constraint (10) binds. We only need to explain how (9) will hold strictly as the rest are straightforward. The overall change in the RHS of (9.3) is

$$\begin{aligned} = & -\alpha(g_1)[C(\hat{g}_2 + \epsilon - g_1) - C(\hat{g}_2 - g_1)] + \delta\alpha(\hat{g}_2 + \epsilon)[\hat{\mathcal{A}}_2 - C(\hat{g}_3 - \hat{g}_2 - \epsilon)] \\ & -\delta\alpha(\hat{g}_2)[\hat{\mathcal{A}}_2 - C(\hat{g}_3 - \hat{g}_2)] + \delta^2\alpha(\hat{g}_3)[\mathcal{A}'_3 - \hat{\mathcal{A}}_3], \end{aligned}$$

which can be kept suitably small due to continuity of the expression in ϵ , to preserve the strict inequality of (9.3). Thus, g_3 can be increased by a small enough amount to $\hat{g}_3 + \gamma(\epsilon)$ (i.e., $\gamma(\epsilon) > 0$) so that all the strict inequalities in (7), (8), (9) continue to hold and (10) binds, which would be a contradiction. Q.E.D.

Numerical simulation on aid diversion. Using Mathematica, governance g_3 is maximized under the assumption that $g_1 = 0$, $\alpha(g) = 1 - g$ and two alternative cost (of governance improvement) assumptions – linear ($C(x) = x$) and quadratic ($C(x) = x^2$). The results are reported below in Tables B.2 and B.3.

As one can see, under the optimal program the constraint (8) in most cases is in slack, i.e. $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_2 - C(\hat{g}_3 - \hat{g}_2) > 0$. Further, the column (8)/ \mathcal{A} indicates that in percentage terms interim aid diversion can be significant, as high as 38% (refer Table B.3); also, *the aid diversion percentage tends to increase with the aid budget for both Tables.*

\mathcal{A}	$\hat{\mathcal{A}}_1$	\hat{g}_2	$\hat{\mathcal{A}}_2$	\hat{g}_3	$\hat{\mathcal{A}}_3$	(6')	(7)	(8)	(8)/ \mathcal{A}
1	0.227777	0.227777	0.294963	0.52274	0.47726	1	3.02014E-008	3.49962E-009	–
1.1	0.240472	0.240472	0.316607	0.557078	0.542922	1.09999998825149	3.56359317610355E-008	9.49248957216042E-010	–
1.2	0.251799	0.251799	0.336539	0.588337	0.611663	1.2	0	4.996E-016	–
1.3	0.263458	0.263458	0.357695	0.616717	0.678847	1.3	-5.55112E-017	0.00443544	–
1.4	0.289326	0.289326	0.407116	0.642875	0.703558	1.4	-5.55112E-017	0.0535668	3.82%
1.5	0.313953	0.313953	0.457626	0.667253	0.728421	1.5	9.49517E-010	0.104326	6.95%
1.6	0.337126	0.337126	0.508583	0.689943	0.754291	1.6	2.45603E-008	0.155766	9.73%
1.7	0.359195	0.359195	0.560537	0.711042	0.780268	1.7	-1.11022E-016	0.20869	12.27%
1.8	0.380132	0.380132	0.613246	0.730642	0.806623	1.8	-1.66533E-016	0.262735	14.59%
1.9	0.4	0.4	0.666667	0.748837	0.833333	1.9	0	0.317829	16.72%
2	0.418861	0.418861	0.720759	0.765718	0.86038	2	1.11022E-016	0.373903	18.69%

\mathcal{A}	(9)	(10)
1	7.23845E-008	-2.17419E-010
1.1	7.91897344643022E-008	5.84201764741721E-009
1.2	-5.55112E-017	0
1.3	-5.55112E-017	0
1.4	-5.55112E-017	0
1.5	5.18476E-008	-5.36185E-009
1.6	1.51515E-008	3.55657E-008
1.7	-5.55112E-017	0
1.8	0	0
1.9	5.55112E-017	0
2	5.55112E-017	0

Table B.2: Simulation results: $C(x) = x$

\mathcal{A}	$\hat{\mathcal{A}}_1$	\hat{g}_2	$\hat{\mathcal{A}}_2$	\hat{g}_3	$\hat{\mathcal{A}}_3$	(6')	(7)	(8)	(8)/ \mathcal{A}	(9)	(10)
1	0.198828	0.445901	0.358831	0.822418	0.442341	1	0.000000008	0.217066	21.7%	2.57873E-008	-3.59719E-010
1.1	0.216793	0.46561	0.405683	0.841707	0.477524	1.1	1.26257E-008	0.264234	24%	2.69114E-009	-2.2499E-009
1.2	0.234299	0.484045	0.454108	0.85855	0.511593	1.2	-2.55361E-009	0.313854	26.15%	1.84779E-008	3.69984E-009
1.3	0.251265	0.501263	0.503802	0.873313	0.544933	1.3	-3.64195E-009	0.365381	28.1%	0.000000025	-5.33398E-009
1.4	0.267717	0.517414	0.554756	0.886296	0.577527	1.4	-2.91145E-009	0.418682	29.9%	2.77482E-008	-2.9198E-009
1.5	0.283647	0.532585	0.606843	0.897745	0.60951	1.5	0	0.473502	31.56%	0	0
1.6	0.299107	0.546907	0.660144	0.907866	0.640749	1.6	1.43339E-008	0.529852	33.11%	4.2321E-008	-7.31378E-010
1.7	0.314246	0.560577	0.715134	0.916836	0.670619	1.7	1.10953E-008	0.588214	34.6%	3.31976E-008	-3.71714E-010
1.8	0.328725	0.573346	0.770472	0.9248	0.700803	1.8	-1.49228E-009	0.646952	35.94%	2.85905E-008	-8.61455E-009
1.9	0.342547	0.585275	0.825962	0.931886	0.731491	1.9	0.000000023	0.705823	37.14%	7.63415E-008	2.23736E-007
2	0.356105	0.596745	0.883076	0.938202	0.760819	2	-2.77556E-017	0.766483	38.32%	5.55112E-017	0

Table B.3: Simulation results: $C(x) = x^2$

Remark 2. The entry, E, refers to exponential function. (6') is computed for the value of $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_1 + \hat{\mathcal{A}}_2 + \hat{\mathcal{A}}_3$. (7)–(10) are computed for the surplus values, LHS-RHS of the constraints. Although all surplus values are not exactly zeros, for most cases the values are very close to zeros so that we could take the constraint as “approximately” binding. In particular, there are no inconsistencies between Table B.2 entries showing at several places $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_1 = \hat{g}_2$ and yet the surplus values in constraint (10) not showing exactly zeros, because both $\hat{\mathcal{A}}_1$ and \hat{g}_2 (just like other choice variables) are approximations that are equal up to a certain number of decimal points. Finally, for the blue colored cells the surplus values are significantly positive, so the constraint (8) can be taken to be slack. Finally, in the Mathematica program we have written the budget constraint as weak inequality, as follows:

$$\mathcal{A}_1 + \mathcal{A}_2 + \mathcal{A}_3 \leq \mathcal{A}. \quad (6')$$

However, as one can see from Tables B.2 and B.3, in almost all cases the optimal aid profile binds the budget constraint.

Note that Table B.3 numbers for \hat{g}_2 and \hat{g}_3 for any given \mathcal{A} can be generated using simple Mathematica plot for quadratic cost specification as in Fig. 1 (which set $\mathcal{A} = 1.9$). ||

Proof of Lemma A.1. (i) That both (7) and (8) must bind follow from sequential rationality and Proposition 1.

Suppose (10) does not bind, so (10) holds with strict inequality. Then \mathcal{A}_1 can be reduced slightly, and \mathcal{A}_2 and \mathcal{A}_3 can be increased slightly. We then argue that one can increase g_3 in a manner that (7) and (8) binds (so that sequential rationality is satisfied), and the other constraints hold, which would be a contradiction.

Now let us increase g_3 by $\epsilon > 0$ but small. Then the corresponding change in \mathcal{A}_3 so as

to keep (7) binding is

$$\delta\alpha(g_3^*) d\mathcal{A}_3 = \alpha(g_2^*)C'(g_3^* - g_2^*) dg_3 - \delta\alpha'(g_3^*)\mathcal{A}_3^* dg_3.$$

Similarly, the change in \mathcal{A}_2 so as to keep (8) binding is

$$d\mathcal{A}_2 = C'(g_3^* - g_2^*) dg_3.$$

Substituting the above two in (9) the LHS becomes

$$\begin{aligned} &= \frac{\delta\alpha(g_2^*)}{\alpha(g_1)} \left[C'(g_3^* - g_2^*) dg_3 - C'(g_3^* - g_2^*) dg_3 \right] + \frac{\delta^2}{\alpha(g_1)} \left[\alpha(g_3^*) d\mathcal{A}_3 + \alpha'(g_3^*)\mathcal{A}_3^* dg_3 \right] \\ &= \frac{\delta\alpha(g_2^*)}{\alpha(g_1)} C'(g_3^* - g_2^*) dg_3 > 0, \end{aligned}$$

thus satisfying the constraint. The contradiction is finally established.

(ii) Part (i) together with the IC condition (9) imply that $\alpha(g_1)\mathcal{A}_1^* \leq \delta^2\alpha(g_3^*)\mathcal{A}_3^* = \delta\alpha(g_2^*)\mathcal{A}_2^*$. The ranking of \mathcal{A}_i^* 's follows from the fact that $\alpha(g_1) \geq \alpha(g_2^*) \geq \alpha(g_3^*)$ and $1 \geq \delta \geq 0$.

(iii) Follows from the previous steps, applying that $C(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing: $C(g_3^* - g_2^*) = \mathcal{A}_2^* \geq \mathcal{A}_1^* = C(g_2^* - g_1)$.

(iv) Suppose to the contrary that (9) does not bind. Then, given part (i), the donor's problem can be written as:

max g_3 , subject to

$$\delta\mathcal{A}_3 = \frac{\alpha(g_2)}{\alpha(g_3)}C(g_3 - g_2), \quad (7.3)$$

$$\mathcal{A}_2 = C(g_3 - g_2), \quad (8.3)$$

$$\alpha(g_1)\mathcal{A}_1 < \alpha(g_1)[\mathcal{A}_1 - C(g_2 - g_1)] + \delta\alpha(g_2)[\mathcal{A}_2 - C(g_3 - g_2)] + \delta^2\alpha(g_3)\mathcal{A}_3, \quad (9.3)$$

$$\mathcal{A}_1 = C(g_2 - g_1). \quad (10.3)$$

Having solved the above problem, below we will return to our (star) notations for the optimal incentives under the PCC program.

Let us increase g_2 to $g_2^* + \epsilon$, $\epsilon > 0$ small. Then define

$$Z(\epsilon) = \frac{\alpha(g_2^* + \epsilon)}{\alpha(g_3^*)}C(g_3^* - g_2^* - \epsilon) + C(g_2^* + \epsilon - g_1).$$

Thus $Z(\cdot)$ is the sum of the RHS of (7.3) and (10.3), taking the increase in g_2 into account. Next observe that

$$Z'(0) \equiv Z'(\epsilon)|_{\epsilon=0} = -\frac{\alpha(g_2^*)}{\alpha(g_3^*)}C'(g_3^* - g_2^*) + \frac{\alpha'(g_2^*)}{\alpha(g_3^*)}C(g_3^* - g_2^*) + C'(g_2^* - g_1).$$

Given that $C(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing and weakly convex, $\alpha(g)$ is strictly decreasing (Assumption 1), $g_3^* \geq g_2^*$, and $g_3^* - g_2^* \geq g_2^* - g_1$ (by part (iii) above), it follows that

$$Z'(0) < 0. \tag{B.2}$$

Next note that for ϵ sufficiently small, conditions (7), (8), and (9) will all hold with strict inequality; however, (10) will be violated.⁵⁰ We next argue that $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2, \mathcal{A}_3$ can be adjusted in such a way that all the required weak inequalities will hold (including equalities).

Let X', X, Y respectively denote the absolute values of the changes in the RHS of (7.3), (8.3), and (10.3) respectively. Given (B.2), for ϵ small,

$$X' > Y.$$

Next consider $\mathcal{A}'_1, \mathcal{A}'_2, \mathcal{A}'_3$ such that

$$\mathcal{A}'_1 = \mathcal{A}_1^* + Y, \quad \mathcal{A}'_2 = \mathcal{A}_2^*, \quad \text{and} \quad \mathcal{A}'_3 = \mathcal{A}_3^* - Y.$$

Observe that with the above reallocation of the aid budget (from period 3 to period 1), all the inequalities in (7), (8), (9) will continue to hold strictly (as after the g_2 increase), and now constraint (10) binds.⁵¹ We only need to explain how (9) will hold strictly as the rest are straightforward. The overall change in the LHS of (9.3) is

$$\begin{aligned} &= -\alpha(g_1)[C(g_2^* + \epsilon - g_1) - C(g_2^* - g_1)] + \delta\alpha(g_2^* + \epsilon)[\mathcal{A}_2^* - C(g_3^* - g_2^* - \epsilon)] \\ &\quad - \delta\alpha(g_2^*)[\mathcal{A}_2^* - C(g_3^* - g_2^*)] - \delta^2\alpha(g_3^*)[C(g_2^* + \epsilon - g_1) - C(g_2^* - g_1)], \end{aligned}$$

which can be kept suitably small due to continuity of the expression in ϵ , to preserve the strict inequality of (9.3). Thus, g_3 can be increased by a small enough amount to $g_3^* + \gamma(\epsilon)$ (i.e., $\gamma(\epsilon) > 0$) so that all the strict inequalities in (7), (8), (9) continue to hold and (10) binds, which would be a contradiction.

⁵⁰Here while we refer to the original feasibility constraints in section 4, the reader may as well think in terms of (7.3)–(10.3), for ease of visualization.

⁵¹Verification that (10) binds would be as follows: $\mathcal{A}'_1 = \mathcal{A}_1^* + Y = \mathcal{A}_1^* + C(g_2^* + \epsilon - g_1) - C(g_2^* - g_1) = C(g_2^* + \epsilon - g_1)$.

Given that we require sequential rationality, we need to be slightly more careful as adjusted \mathcal{A}'_2 and \mathcal{A}'_3 above do not bind (7) and (8).

First note that $\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \gamma(\epsilon) = 0$. Starting from the PCC deviation program $(\mathcal{A}'_1, \mathcal{A}'_2, \mathcal{A}'_3, g_2^* + \epsilon, g_3^* + \gamma(\epsilon))$, we will now construct another program with (7) and (8) holding with equality and a final governance level higher than g_3^* .

For any $\epsilon > 0$, consider $\rho(\epsilon) > 0$ and $\beta(\epsilon) > 0$ such that (7) and (8) are satisfied with equality:

$$\begin{aligned} \delta \frac{\alpha(g_3^* + \gamma(\epsilon))}{\alpha(g_2^* + \epsilon)} (\mathcal{A}'_3 - \rho(\epsilon)) &= C(g_3^* + \gamma(\epsilon) - g_2^* - \epsilon), \\ \mathcal{A}'_2 - \beta(\epsilon) &= C(g_3^* + \gamma(\epsilon) - g_2^* - \epsilon). \end{aligned}$$

Since

$$\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \beta(\epsilon) = 0 = \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \rho(\epsilon)$$

(because in the limit we should get back (7.3) and (8.3), along with $\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \gamma(\epsilon) = 0$), for some $\bar{\epsilon} > 0$ small enough the following must be true

$$\begin{aligned} \delta \alpha(g_2^* + \bar{\epsilon}) (\mathcal{A}'_2 - \beta(\bar{\epsilon}) - C(g_3^* + \gamma(\bar{\epsilon}) - g_2^* - \bar{\epsilon})) + \delta^2 \alpha(g_3^* + \gamma(\bar{\epsilon})) (\mathcal{A}'_3 - \rho(\bar{\epsilon})) \\ \geq \alpha(g_1) C(g_2^* + \bar{\epsilon} - g_1), \end{aligned}$$

because otherwise we will have contradicted (9) using continuity of both sides of the above inequality (in ϵ).

This last inequality (satisfying (9)), for the revised program

$$(\mathcal{A}'_1 + \rho(\bar{\epsilon}) + \beta(\bar{\epsilon}), \mathcal{A}'_2 - \beta(\bar{\epsilon}), \mathcal{A}'_3 - \rho(\bar{\epsilon}), g_2^* + \bar{\epsilon}, g_3^* + \gamma(\bar{\epsilon})),$$

establishes that the overall governance level is improved to $g_3^* + \gamma(\bar{\epsilon})$ while satisfying time consistency – a contradiction. Note that while arriving at the contraction constraint (10) remains slack: $\mathcal{A}'_1 + \rho(\bar{\epsilon}) + \beta(\bar{\epsilon}) > C(g_2^* + \bar{\epsilon} - g_1)$; time consistency (or sequential rationality) requires only (7) and (8) to bind.⁵² This completes the argument.

(v) Suppose not so that $\mathcal{A}_1^* = 0$. This implies $g_2^* = g_1$ since (10) is binding. So, (9) can be re-written after using (10) as:

$$\alpha(g_3^*) \mathcal{A}_3^* \geq 0.$$

Clearly, $\mathcal{A}_3^* > 0$, otherwise the program reduces to an one-shot one. Thus, under the

⁵²That constraint (10) should bind is a requirement of the optimal PCC program as shown in part (i) above, but not for sequential rationality.

contraposition hypothesis (9) can be written as

$$\alpha(\mathbf{g}_3^*)\mathcal{A}_3^* > 0,$$

assuming $\alpha(\mathbf{g}) > 0, \forall \mathbf{g}$. That is, (9) is non-binding. But this contradicts the result in part (iv).

(vi) Follows from part (v) and the fact that (10) is binding as shown in part (i). Q.E.D.

Proof of Lemma 2. (i)-(ii) Follows by straightforward differentiation of the expressions of $F(\mathbf{g}_2, \mathbf{g}_3; \mathcal{A})$ and $I(\mathbf{g}_2, \mathbf{g}_3; \mathcal{A})$, i.e. (11) and (12).

(iii) Recalling that $F_1(\mathbf{g}_2, \mathbf{g}_3; \mathcal{A}) = \frac{\partial F(\mathbf{g}_2, \mathbf{g}_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathbf{g}_2}$, we have

$$\frac{\partial F(\mathbf{g}_2, \mathbf{g}_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathbf{g}_2} = C'(\mathbf{g}_3 - \mathbf{g}_2) - C'(\mathbf{g}_2 - \mathbf{g}_1) + \frac{\alpha(\mathbf{g}_2)C'(\mathbf{g}_3 - \mathbf{g}_2)}{\delta\alpha(\mathbf{g}_3)} - \frac{\alpha'(\mathbf{g}_2)C(\mathbf{g}_3 - \mathbf{g}_2)}{\delta\alpha(\mathbf{g}_3)},$$

which is positive whenever either $\mathbf{g}_3 - \mathbf{g}_2 \geq \mathbf{g}_2 - \mathbf{g}_1$ (recall that $C''(\cdot) \geq 0$), or $C(\cdot)$ is linear.

By the implicit function theorem, we have

$$\frac{\partial f(\mathbf{g}_2, \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathbf{g}_2} = -\frac{\frac{\partial F(\mathbf{g}_2, \mathbf{g}_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathbf{g}_2}}{\frac{\partial F(\mathbf{g}_2, \mathbf{g}_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathbf{g}_3}}.$$

Next observe that

$$\frac{\partial F(\mathbf{g}_2, \mathbf{g}_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathbf{g}_3} = -C'(\mathbf{g}_3 - \mathbf{g}_2) + \frac{\alpha(\mathbf{g}_2)\alpha'(\mathbf{g}_3)C(\mathbf{g}_3 - \mathbf{g}_2)}{\delta(\alpha(\mathbf{g}_3))^2} - \frac{\alpha(\mathbf{g}_2)C'(\mathbf{g}_3 - \mathbf{g}_2)}{\delta\alpha(\mathbf{g}_3)},$$

which is negative. The proof now follows from the signs of $\frac{\partial F(\mathbf{g}_2, \mathbf{g}_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathbf{g}_2}$, $\frac{\partial F(\mathbf{g}_2, \mathbf{g}_3; \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathbf{g}_3}$ and the expression for $\frac{\partial f(\mathbf{g}_2, \mathcal{A})}{\partial \mathbf{g}_2}$.

(iv) First, using $\mathbf{i}(\mathbf{g}_2, \mathcal{A})$ in (12) and evaluating it at $\mathbf{g}_2 = \mathbf{g}_1$ together with the fact that $\mathcal{A} > 0$ implies that $\mathbf{i}(\mathbf{g}_1, \mathcal{A}) > \mathbf{g}_1$. Now given that $\mathbf{i}(\mathbf{g}_1, \mathcal{A}) > \mathbf{g}_1$, we have, using (11) and (12),

$$F(\mathbf{g}_1, \mathbf{i}(\mathbf{g}_1, \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) = I(\mathbf{g}_1, \mathbf{i}(\mathbf{g}_1, \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) - C(\mathbf{i}(\mathbf{g}_1, \mathcal{A}) - \mathbf{g}_1) < I(\mathbf{g}_1, \mathbf{i}(\mathbf{g}_1, \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) = 0,$$

where the inequality follows since $C(\mathbf{i}(\mathbf{g}_1, \mathcal{A}) - \mathbf{g}_1) > 0$. Finally, given that $F(\mathbf{g}_1, \mathbf{i}(\mathbf{g}_1, \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) < 0$, $F(\mathbf{g}_1, \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{g}_1, \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) = 0$, and $F(\mathbf{g}_2, \mathbf{g}_3; \mathcal{A})$ is strictly decreasing in \mathbf{g}_3 , we will have $\mathbf{i}(\mathbf{g}_1, \mathcal{A}) > \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{g}_1, \mathcal{A})$.

(v) Straightforward differentiation yields that

$$I_{12}(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}) = - \frac{\alpha'(g_2)C'(g_3 - g_2)}{\delta\alpha(g_3)} + \frac{\alpha'(g_2)\alpha'(g_3)C(g_3 - g_2)}{\delta\alpha^2(g_3)} \\ + \frac{\alpha(g_3)C''(g_3 - g_2)}{\delta\alpha(g_3)} - \frac{\alpha(g_2)\alpha'(g_3)C'(g_3 - g_2)}{\delta\alpha^2(g_3)} > 0,$$

since $\alpha'(\cdot) < 0$ and $C''(\cdot) \geq 0$.

(vi) For the case when $C(\cdot)$ and $\alpha(\cdot)$ are both linear, by differentiating we have:

$$I_{11}(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A}) = \frac{2\alpha'(g_2)C'(g_3 - g_2)}{\delta\alpha(g_3)} + \frac{\alpha(g_1)C'(g_2 - g_1)\alpha'(g_2)}{\delta\alpha(g_2)} \\ - \frac{2\alpha(g_1)C'(g_2 - g_1)(\alpha'(g_2))^2}{\delta\alpha^3(g_2)} < 0,$$

since $\alpha'(\cdot) < 0$.

Q.E.D.

Proof of Lemma 3. The argument presented below should be studied with Figs. 2 and 3.




Figure 2: Proof of Lemma 3(i), Case (a)

(i) Suppose not. There are two cases to consider.

Case (a). First, suppose to the contrary that $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ is not strictly increasing for $g_2 < g_2^*$. Then there exists $g'_2 < g_2^*$ such that $i'(g'_2, \mathcal{A}) = 0$, so that $I_1(g'_2, i(g'_2, \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) = 0$.




Figure 3: Proof of Lemma 3(i), Case (b)

We first observe that $i'(g_2, \mathcal{A}) = -\frac{I_1(\cdot)}{I_2(\cdot)}$. Given that $I_2 < 0$ (from Lemma 2(i)), and $I_1(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})|_{g_2=g_1} = -\frac{\alpha'(g_2)C(g_3-g_1)}{\delta\alpha(g_3)} + \frac{\alpha(g_1)C'(g_3-g_1)}{\delta\alpha(g_3)} > 0$, it follows that $i'(g_1, \mathcal{A}) > 0$. Given that $i'(g_1, \mathcal{A}) > 0$, it is sufficient to consider the case where g_2' is a local maximizer of $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$, and hence there exists g_2'' , where $g_2' < g_2'' < g_2^*$, and g_2'' is a local minimizer of $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ such that $i(g_2'', \mathcal{A}) < i(g_2', \mathcal{A})$ and $I_1(g_2'', i(g_2'', \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) = 0$. Hence

$$\begin{aligned}
0 &= I_1(g_2', i(g_2', \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) \\
&> I_1(g_2'', i(g_2', \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) \quad (\text{since } g_2' < g_2'', \text{ and, from Assumption 3(i), } I_{11} < 0) \\
&> I_1(g_2'', i(g_2'', \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) \quad (\text{since } i(g_2'', \mathcal{A}) < i(g_2', \mathcal{A}), \text{ and, from Lemma 2(v), } I_{12} > 0),
\end{aligned}$$

which contradicts the fact that g_2'' is a local minimizer.

Case (b). Next, suppose to the contrary that $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ is not strictly decreasing for $g_2 > g_2^*$. Then there exists $g_2' > g_2^*$ such that $I_1(g_2', i(g_2', \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) = 0$. Hence

$$\begin{aligned}
0 = I_1(g_2^*, i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) &> I_1(g_2', i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) \quad (\text{since } g_2' > g_2^*, \text{ and } I_{11} < 0) \\
&\geq I_1(g_2', i(g_2', \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) \quad (\text{since } i(g_2', \mathcal{A}) \leq i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A}), \text{ and } I_{12} > 0),
\end{aligned}$$

which is a contradiction.

(ii) Suppose $i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A}) < f(g_2^*, \mathcal{A})$ (see Fig. 2). Given that $F(g_2, g_3; \mathcal{A})$ is strictly decreasing in g_3 , this implies $F(g_2^*, i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A}); \mathcal{A}) > 0$, so that $(g_2^*, i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A}))$ satisfies both the constraints (11) and (12). Finally, recalling that $i(g_2, \mathcal{A})$ has a unique maximizer g_2^* (from part (i) of this lemma), and the set of feasible g_3 , from (12), is $\{g_3 | g_3 \leq i(g_2, \mathcal{A})\}$, the optimal solution must involve $g_3^* = i(g_2^*, \mathcal{A})$.

We next prove the causality in the reverse direction. Suppose the outcome involves interim aid diversion so that the optimal g_2 , call it \hat{g}_2 , satisfies $i(\hat{g}_2, \mathcal{A}) < f(\hat{g}_2, \mathcal{A})$. We next argue that it must be that $\hat{g}_2 < g_2^*$. Suppose to the contrary that $\hat{g}_2 > g_2^*$. Then, for ϵ positive but small, from part (i) of this lemma and Assumption 3(i) earlier it follows that $(\hat{g}_2 - \epsilon, i(\hat{g}_2 - \epsilon, \mathcal{A}))$ is feasible and yields a higher level of g_3 , which contradicts the optimality of \hat{g}_2 . Hence $\hat{g}_2 < g_2^*$. But, then for ϵ positive but small, from part (i) of this lemma it follows that $(\hat{g}_2 + \epsilon, i(\hat{g}_2 + \epsilon, \mathcal{A}))$ is feasible and yields a higher level of g_3 (see Figure 4). This is a contradiction. Q.E.D.




Figure 4: Proof of Lemma 3(ii); increase in g_2 leads to improved g_3