

# EASTERNIZATION MEETS WESTERNIZATION

## Patriotic Youth Organizations in French Indochina during World War II

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Although colonizers generally repressed emergent national movements as potential vehicles of national liberation, the French encouraged patriotic mobilizations in Indochina in the early 1940s as a way to counteract Thai irredentists, Vietnamese revolutionaries, and Japanese occupiers and their claims of "Asia for Asians."<sup>1</sup> Here, colonial authorities sought to build allegiance to the empire by "patriotizing" youth attitudes through sports activities and youth corps. Participation in such youth organizations mushroomed in Indochina between 1940 and 1945, gaining over a million members in that short span.<sup>2</sup> The governor general of Indochina reported 600,000 members in youth corps in February 1944 alone.<sup>3</sup> The discourse employed by the French through these youth organizations aimed to promote a three-layered patriotism, a love of the Indo-Chinese people: for their colonial country (or *pays*, i.e., Cambodia), for the colonial federation of Indochina (encompassing the protectorates of Tonkin, Annam, Laos, Cambodia, and the colony of Cochinchina), and for the French empire and metropole. Authorities hoped to encourage such patriotism without furthering an elite-driven nationalist political program that would pursue independence from external control.<sup>4</sup> This article examines patriotic youth mobilization policies in Indochina in the 1940-1945 period, as efforts to shape the collective identities of colonial subjects and to strengthen their loyalty to France. Paradoxically, a set of patriotic practices and discourses sponsored by the colonial state promoted indigenous nationalism. In effect, the French colonial state committed intellectual and political suicide by creating systems of repressive rules which some natives turned to their own benefit.

Rulers realized that allegiance to the *petit pays* of the colonies could neither be excessively nor carelessly encouraged. The governor general of Indochina summarized the problem in this way:

I frequently reminded them that inside the “Indo-Chinese Federation,” each country had the right, and even the duty, to claim openly to adhere to a local patriotism, to remain faithful to its religion, to its history, to its sovereign, if it had one, so long as it never forgot that next to and even above the small homeland, the thoughts of all should go constantly to the grand French homeland, guardian and protector of the Federation, to which the Indo-Chinese had even more obligation to remain faithful. Although I actually encouraged specific “patriotisms,” on the other hand I formally condemned “nationalisms” of all kinds, because they had a xenophobic and anti-French tendency, and received their orders from abroad.<sup>5</sup>

Unlike John Breuilly, who sees little analytical gain in differentiating “patriotism” from “nationalism”—to him, the first is often merely a term of praise whereas the second is a term of abuse—I believe each had important and particular political ramifications for French state actors during World War II.<sup>6</sup> It was a critical distinction for the French to draw, for many of their subjects abroad rejected the imperial model of the ruling nation-state and sought to replace it with one of their own making. The danger stemmed from the fact that promoting patriotism could be perceived, consciously or not, as furthering a “soft” nationalism in the sense that it stimulated attachment to a geographic entity that in turn could lead to a desire for the creation of a distinct nation.<sup>7</sup> To what extent, and precisely how, are nationalism and patriotism transnational political processes? If, as Benedict Anderson argues, western nation-states provided emergent and newly independent nations of the post-World War II era with adaptable “modules” of different types of nationalism, what precisely was the content of these models, and which techniques were transferred?<sup>8</sup>

This article’s focus on the transnationalization of mass patriotism in Indochina addresses two lacunae in literature on nationalism, particularly in the work of “constructivists,” who view the nation as a collective act of socio-cultural imagination. The first lacuna concerns the stability of western “official” nationalism. Benedict Anderson, for example, views the developing world’s nationalisms as derivative recombinations of “modules” that formed and stabilized in the West. Yet nationalism in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s was highly variable.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, the Vichy regime fostered a patriotic version that it then deployed to Indochina just prior to the collapse of French rule there. Second, bilingual indigenous intellectuals are crucial to the comparative literature on nationalist movements in colonies, mainly because they had access to Western models of national renewal in academic schools.<sup>10</sup> Yet during World War II, the vast majority of colonized youth spoke no French; many received part of their training outside of schools through state-sponsored extracurricular activities such as youth groups and sport activities. Through these activities, colonial authorities attempted to shape the bodies, behaviors, and attitudes of the young to defend and serve the interests of the empire.

First, this research describes the importance of the creation of a unifying federal institutional structure and ideology, which the French hoped would consolidate disparate ethnic and religious groups found in local territories

into a coherent, hierarchical political system. Second, the specialization of the program through its adaptation to widely varying local cultural contexts is described. Finally, the research addresses the various local responses to the French project, which ranged from militant resistance to a more peaceful accommodation. These three factors—consolidation, specialization, and response—are at the heart of transnational processes of patriotism and nationalism and offer an account of transnational political mobilization that differs from and supplements the account of constructivists like Benedict Anderson.


### **Patriotic Consolidation and “Westernization”: Youth of French Empire and Sport**

Overseas scouting began to assume a real presence in the twenties. Indochina met the first scout troop in Tonkin (northern Vietnam) in 1929; the “Courbet Troop,” as it was known, included six French members. Two years later, the prospect for scouting remained bleak in Tonkin, as the organization struggled to attract youngsters. It seemed hostile to indigenous people, who thought of it as a new type of militia; the hot and humid climate made outdoor activities difficult; and French youth, served by servants, did not see the point of joining an organization based on encouraging boys to perform outdoor training to develop character, manual ability and public spirit. Other scout leaders and scholars claimed that the first nondenominational scout groups appeared in 1930 around the high schools of Hanoi and Saigon. Protestant and Catholic branches later emerged in private schools.<sup>11</sup> Scout activities were sponsored by such elites as the Emperor Bao Dai, who served as the honorary president of the scouts of Annam (central Vietnam) in 1935.<sup>12</sup> By 1935, scouting, which had initially been practiced only within certain private schools in Indochina, began to expand to include public schools, thanks to, among other reasons, the visit of the French National Commissioner of the *Éclaireurs de France*.<sup>13</sup> Another force promoting the development of scouting in Indochina was a road trip taken by two scout members, Guy de Larigaudie and Roger Drapier, who drove from Paris to Saigon in the late 1930s. Received in Indochina by local authorities and scout organizations, they gave many speeches recounting their journey, during which they applied the scout ideals.<sup>14</sup> Following a plenary council organized by Pope Pius IX in 1934, church members decided to develop Catholic youth organizations, including Catholic scouts, in Indochina.<sup>15</sup> The Popular Front also tried to develop physical education and sports in the colonies, especially in 1936 and 1937, without much success. According to World War II state officials, this was due to the absence of determined and qualified leaders to guide this project, as well as to the lack of a national plan for the colony.<sup>16</sup>

After 1940, the colonial state built new youth institutions based on the small preexisting network of confessional and lay youth corps and cadres. By 1941, youth movements in Indochina were first organized at the provincial

level, within each colony, around a “local chief” and some provincial schools. At the federal level, a broad umbrella organization called “Youth of French Empire” (*Jeunesse d’Empire Français*) united existing movements such as the Scouts and various Christian and new secular groups. For instance, in the Cambodian case, authorities established the *Yuvan Kampucherath* movement in 1941 with King Norodom Sihanouk as its head. In addition, other youth movements were created after 1940, which varied somewhat in the different regions: “Young Campers” in Cochinchina, “Young Teams of Tonkin,” “Youth of Annam,” and “Young Laotians.”<sup>17</sup> “Youth of French Empire” also encompassed “school youth groups” and local assemblies. The local assemblies were a means of controlling and organizing youth who belonged neither to school groups and sporting leagues, or to a specialized youth organization, such as the Scouts. Such assemblies were sometimes organized by trades. In Cambodia they often centered around the local pagoda; in Vietnam they were organized around the village, where social life was concentrated.<sup>18</sup> “Youth of French Empire,” an analog to the metropolitan “Youth of France,” carried the same motto as the original: “United and Strong in Order to Serve.” These organizations aimed to teach youngsters to obey instructions, to develop a spirit of social solidarity, and above all to foster patriotic feelings.

**Figure 1.** Organizational Structure of the Youth of French Empire in Indochina.



Source: "L'organisation de la jeunesse en Indochine," *Le Nouveau Laos* 15 (1 August 1943), p. 3.

The state worked hard to stimulate indigenous youngsters' patriotic identification with the French state. The French authorities censored the press and used it as a means for propaganda, often manipulating the traditional themes of the savior, the nation, and the youth to foster a spirit of duty and sacrifice among the youngsters. More precisely, within youth corps, the French defined patriotism through a "public service ethic," asking their subjects and citizens to be healthy and strong through regular exercise in case the nation required defending. This ethic "enshrined the notion of duty, obligation, and sacrifice, a secular altruism which required the supersession of self in the interest of a higher cause (in this case the French imperial nation)."<sup>19</sup> Patriotism, through sacrifice and national service, would maintain France as a great power. At the heart of the notion of patriotism was the desire for imperial unity behind Marshal Pétain. Various newspapers at the time of the Vichy government's loss of North Africa to the Allies carried claims like this one that appeared in *Voix d'Empire*:

The first law of patriotism is to maintain the unity of the Homeland. If each individual pretended to get a particular idea of what commands patriotic duty, there would be no homeland, no nation; only factions—in the service of personal ambition—would remain.<sup>20</sup>

One of the primary ways that colonialists planned to both forge a more stable union—and at the same time build strong and healthy subjects for the empire—was by creating a "sporting atmosphere." The colonial administration sponsored grandiose events and competitions to remind locals of their shared imperial identity based on a feeling of imperial pride.<sup>21</sup> A manifestation of this ideology was "the race with the torch" in autumn 1941 from Angkor to Hanoi, one of many ceremonial events that literally carried the lesson to considerable numbers of isolated villages. The torch, symbolizing the union of the Indo-Chinese federation, was carried day and night non-stop; when it arrived in Hanoi more than 20,000 spectators were waiting to see it.<sup>22</sup> Referring to the 1942 Hanoi-Saigon-Phnom-Penh bike race—"The Capitol Circuit"—navy captain Maurice Ducoroy, commissioner general for Physical Education, Sports and Youth, wrote optimistically to Decoux: "*I am convinced*, Admiral [Decoux], that this bike race will give unhoped-for results from the viewpoint of union policy...."<sup>23</sup>

Ducoroy reported that "everywhere" mandarins supported the programs, and locals offered "touching marks of affection" because as one put it, "the governor general has decided to strengthen the Annamite race by taking care of its youth."<sup>24</sup> Indeed, federal sports demonstrations occurred at a regular pace, most often in the temperate months of December and January. Ducoroy organized military sporting tournaments (including the army, air force, and navy) during the winter season of 1941-1942<sup>25</sup>; the Tour d'Indochine bike race, from December 1942 to February 1943<sup>26</sup>; in January 1942, the first circuit of the capitals (Hanoi, Phnom Penh) bicycle team race; the tour of selected

athletes in Laos with Captain Ducoroy in March 1942, to convert and to lead Laotian youth and sportsmen into the sporting movement<sup>27</sup>; in April 1942, “Marshal Pétain’s Cup,” a soccer competition among the five *pays*, excepting Laos; later, the first School Championship of Indochina<sup>28</sup>; the various sporting events during the Tournament Fair-Exhibition in December 1942; the Festival for Youth Monitors of Indochina, at Hue in December 1943; “the Olympic Race of Indochina,” where 500 athletes took turns in a running race between Phnom Penh and Hanoi in December of 1943; and the second Tour d’Indochine in January 1944.<sup>29</sup>

Sports clearly provided new forums for patriotism in Indochina. Both British and French imperial authorities believed that sports provided an ethical training ground for the future leaders of their empires, by promoting not only imperial pride in athletes’ physical achievements, but also by fostering an elite with character and a sense of mutual help.<sup>30</sup> Through such a patriotic policy, colonial officers hoped to produce consensual values in a diversified cultural environment. In 1941, the French created the General Commissariat for Physical Education, Sports, and Youth and established schools to train Indo-Chinese sports instructors and youth cadres. French authorities in the 1940s also promoted swimming as a “national” Indo-Chinese sport—due to its prior popularity in a region of countless ponds and streams. Toward this end the state organized a competition called the “Open Tournament of Swimming”; participants had to demonstrate that they could dive and then swim fifty meters. It was claimed that 700,000 persons (youngsters and adults) had succeeded in this competition by the end of 1944; at a time when the entire Indo-Chinese population numbered only 24 million, this represented three percent of all inhabitants. In addition, sports facilities were built at a very rapid pace. From 1940 to 1944, the number of stadiums in Indochina increased from 120 to 1,111<sup>31</sup>; the number of swimming pools, from 22 to 210; the number of monitors of physical education, from 44 to 1,016; the number of sports clubs, from 260 to 1,129; and the number of licensed sportsmen, from 10,200 to 86,075.<sup>32</sup> Such competitions, building on instruction and facilities expansion, consciously attempted to bind the people of the five colonies into one federation faithful to the “motherland” France.<sup>33</sup>

### **Patriotic Consolidation and “Easternization”: Adapting Youth Programs to Local Cultures**

French state actors appealed to the emotional attachment of Cambodians to their king, and to religious and philosophical cultural systems—in this case Buddhism and Confucianism—to link residents to the state.<sup>34</sup> The self-interested behavior of officials such as colonial administrators resulted in part from their understanding the benefits of inventing and playing upon societal values. In the case at hand, native cultures powerfully influenced the building of

institutions, mainly because officials wanted these organizations to appear compatible with local cultures.

The Cambodian case was distinguished in large part by its reverence for the king, who was extremely popular; many residents believed he wielded supernatural powers in his role as protector of people.<sup>35</sup> Since locals believed that according to the Ramayana “a country without a king enjoys ‘neither rain nor seed, neither wealth nor wife, neither sacrifices nor festivals,’” French officers used this popularity to build social cohesion around the French colonial state.<sup>36</sup> Thus they promoted local patriotic feelings by manipulating the sacred symbol that the king represented as embodiment of the Cambodian nation. As mentioned above, the Yuvan Kampucherath youth movement was created in 1941. The French translated its name as “Companions of Cambodia,” but the term “Yuvan” actually means “youth.” They wore outfits reminiscent of a scout’s: khaki shorts, a short-sleeved shirt and a forage cap. An observer described their organization:

At the bottom ... the rising stream of what outside the actual yuvan we call the local assemblies [*les sections de rassemblement*]. They are made of the run-of-the-mill youth from the outskirts and countrysides and constitute the base where the voluntary yuvan will be recruited. Through the local assemblies, which receive their orders from the yuvan elite, a new Khmer ideal penetrates the heart of the country.<sup>37</sup>

In Cambodia, these local assemblies were applied “on top” of the social structure of the country; since the social life of the village was organized around the pagoda, the movement centered around it. It was managed, preferably, by state employees who had received either training at the camp-school of Tonlé-Bâti or in one of the provincial schools of cadres. In June 1943, Cambodia had approximately 15,500 youth members belonging to local assemblies and 3,500 participants in the new “yuvan” movement.<sup>38</sup>

As for Laos, its borders were the result of France’s annexation of principalities on the east side of the Mekong River in 1893; so arbitrarily defined, Laos excluded more than half of the Lao-speaking population in the region. World War II brought France and Thailand into direct conflict from December 1940 to January 1941, resulting in the latter’s receiving the Lao territories of Sayaboury province and part of Champassak while Cambodia lost most of its two westernmost provinces. In the face of both the Pan-Thai movement, which sought to join all ethnic Thais in Siam, Burma, and Indochina, and attempts by the Japanese to promote pan-Asian culture and political consolidation, the French inspector of education in Laos, Charles Rochet, launched in 1941 the *Lao Nhay* or Lao Renovation Movement to stimulate Lao patriotism and Lao ethnic pride through a series of measures appropriate to the country, including pamphlets, newspapers, theater, songs, rallies, and conferences.<sup>39</sup> As a direct reply to Siamese propaganda, a central information service was created, headed by Rochet.<sup>40</sup> In Vientiane, he also built a cultural association of young Lao intellectuals, whom he taught the rudiments of civics and exalted their

patriotism, through a newspaper printed locally, *le Lao Nhay* (Great Laos), and all kinds of cultural events.<sup>41</sup> As stated in the first issue, the goal of this newspaper was to be a “liaison officer” among readers in order to develop their sense of community and belonging.<sup>42</sup>

One tactic was to expand the Laotian cultural heritage to link people together and create a sense of collective Lao identity. For instance, a committee of Lao poetry was constituted in June 1941 to renovate the local art form.<sup>43</sup> In order to build patriotism and a sense of belonging to the same nation in an area of the world where regionalism was strong and Buddhism pervaded every corner of life, the participants in the Lao Nhay also used religious feasts to foster a national identity. The identity, while based on Buddhism, needed to be distinguished from the Siamese brand since both had the same “rituals, institutions, and sacred language of Hinayana Buddhism.”<sup>44</sup> For instance, in 1944, members of the Lao Nhay movement went to religious events such as the feast of Phra Bat, a pilgrimage location that offers a footprint of Buddha. A public prayer recited on microphone by roughly 100 monks called for “the quick recovery of France and for the tranquility of the Lao country.” Then, the national Lao anthem itself, “The Lao Patriot,” created under French supervision in 1941, was sung after the definition and an historical account of the anthem were given. Finally, a speech explained how Laotians should be thankful to Pétain for keeping Laos “an oasis of peace.”<sup>45</sup> A similar repertoire of patriotic collective action would be used at the feast of the waters in Vientiane in October 1941 and at the feast of That Louang one month later.<sup>46</sup> Likewise, to smash political and cultural links with Siam, the French restored and employed several Buddhist monuments, some having been victims of Siamese aggressions, including the reconstruction of Vat Phra Kaeo and the use of the Vat Sisakhet. All were highly emotive symbols and gestures in the construction of a Laotian national identity and its distancing from Thai competitors.<sup>47</sup> Thus, in the Lao case, patriotism was built in opposition to Thailand and stimulated through Buddhism and the worshipping of certain religious monuments. In addition, French officials used various means to consolidate the foundations of a common nationhood: language formation, redefined political borders, and emotional appeals through songs and hero glorification, for instance. This case best illuminates Benedict Anderson’s first step in the constitution of a nation, that is, the creation of a sense of community, a togetherness among people.<sup>48</sup>

In Vietnam, the main emphasis was on organizing youngsters into youth and sport activities to divert them from politics. Authorities encouraged existing Christian youth organizations to develop and join the state’s project, which saw in them a “tree-nursery” for its cadres. For instance, in 1941, the scouts gathered 5,200 male members drawn mainly from Vietnam.<sup>49</sup> Some scout organizations taught Christian obedience, for Confucianism, unlike Buddhism, did not prevent Christianity from spreading. This fostered a substantial indigenous Catholic group in Vietnam that did not exist in Laos and Cambodia.



By mid-1942, an “Annamite” youth movement called “the Buddhist Children’s Group” began to mobilize. Some of its chiefs had received training in the new state schools for sports instructors and youth cadres. Later, a decree would officially recognize this organization. “The goal of this group consists of the complete education (physical, intellectual, professional, moral and spiritual) of monks, followers, and the Buddhist Youth ... within the context of the laws dictated by Buddha and the directives of the Commissariat General.”<sup>50</sup> This youth organization supported patriotism by stressing youngsters’ cultural attachment to the local religion and Marshal Pétain’s respect for local cultures and traditions. Both Buddhism and Pétain were presented as “objects” embodying the imperial nation. The Vichy regime promoted the notion of an ideological return to a pre-colonial status since it proposed a hierarchical order where each individual had his “pre-ordained” place, and rejected the “false idea of a natural equality among men.”<sup>51</sup>

Indeed, administrators adapted the cult of Pétain itself to Confucian Vietnamese sensibilities by presenting the Marshal as the “Old Sage.” French and Vietnamese patriotic saints and national heroes—such as Joan of Arc and her analog Trung Sisters, who fought Chinese conquerors during the first century—were celebrated through grand demonstrations sponsored by the colonial state. Here, thousands of children dressed in white sporting outfits paraded under the tutelage of instructors wearing white sweaters displaying a victory sign in the tricolors. Authorities promoted patriotism in Vietnam through a narrative binding France and Vietnam to the same fate through the collective imagination of a memory of positive collaboration. State officials forwarded an imperial “imagined community” sharing similar values, ancestry, and martial culture to defend the motherland against foreign aggressors.

### **Varying Indigenous Responses to the Vichy French Indochina Project**

Cambodia was the country where youth was most highly integrated into state-sponsored youth organizations.<sup>52</sup> One factor which helps explain the importance of the youth project in Cambodia was Résident Supérieur Georges Gautier, who firmly supported the political side of the youth project due to the insecurity of the protectorate as it faced an expansionist Thailand. Here, youth movements did not become vehicles for contesting the French presence. Opposition to the colonial regime would, however, come from the Buddhist world, a pre-existing network that survived colonialism—and thus provided a cultural space in which nationalist ideas could develop. Buddhism not only offered religious comfort but a rare civic sphere where residents could affirm their national identity.<sup>53</sup> As in Laos at a later point, the national religion would be a force for nationalism in Cambodia, a force that Vietnam lacked.<sup>54</sup> After the Allies defeated the Japanese in 1945, the Cambodian youth movements,

excepting scouting, “sunk into oblivion.”<sup>55</sup> Cambodians’ respect and love for their king, and the French-organized enhancement of Cambodians’ sense of national identity through the idealization of the Angkorean era, helped steer Cambodian youth away from contesting colonial power. Nevertheless, for thousands of young Cambodians, membership in patriotic youth groups organized along Vichy lines was their first membership in an extra-familial group outside of the *sangha*, the Buddhist monastic order, learning an ethic of public service toward the state.<sup>56</sup>

In Laos, the organization of youth was relatively underdeveloped.<sup>57</sup> Instead, the colonial state invested its energy into stimulating the acceptance and validity of a common Lao national heritage. Lao Nhay aimed to reach the elite among youngsters, many of whom participated. A central actor in sponsoring, presiding over, and assisting many such cultural events was Prince Phetsarath, who later would be a key figure of the Lao Issara, a movement resisting the restoration of French power in 1945. In this, he would be joined by some members of the Lao Nhay. A French political report from November 1945 asserted that the young Laotian elite had stayed faithful to France, in particular within the ranks of teaching personnel, thanks to Rochet and the Lao Nhay movement.<sup>58</sup> Laos’ particular geopolitical situation, its small size, and its recent creation, meant that its elites looked favorably on a “patron-client” relationship either with France, Japan, Thailand, or Vietnam. This nonetheless spawned disputes among Laotians and with those who built this special relationship, leading to “numerous and competing, albeit minuscule, nationalist groups” emerging in provincial capitals by 1945.<sup>59</sup> A new trend was also inaugurated during the Vichy regime which has lasted until today: the politicization of the monks and the political manipulation of the Buddhist sangha to gain support for various political projects.

From the beginning of colonization, the people of Vietnam opposed French rule. This opposition would also be carried out by some of the youths and adults inside the pro-French youth mobilization. Perhaps, as Tønnesson speculates, the French groups provided native youth of all political orientations a legal means of organizing, which was highly valued because it was rare.<sup>60</sup> Even more threatening to the French state, youth projects permitted illegal youth corps to exist semi-legally. For instance, in 1939 high school student Vu Oanh created a procommunist organization called Ngo Nguyen with seven other students. In order to exist legitimately this organization joined a legal tourist organization called Doan Rong (“Troops of Dragons”), that existed in their high school. The organization grew to encompass forty members, who exchanged, read, and discussed Marxist books and other writings.<sup>61</sup>

Already in 1942, the governor general of Indochina had warned of the danger of “subversive elements” taking advantage of sport activities to “infiltrate” sporting associations; they had done so in the past, “sometimes with success.”<sup>62</sup> French authorities knew that some Vietnamese youngsters were joining youth organization for the wrong reasons. For example, French

authorities decided to put local assemblies under constant surveillance in order to control the influence of anti-French ideas.<sup>63</sup> The relatively independent local assemblies required special attention within the “Youth of French Empire,” since leaders saw its members as too free of French organizations’ influence, and thus an easy target for anticolonial propaganda.<sup>64</sup> During World War II, some youth groups in villages were poorly managed and became infiltrated by “agitators” who contested notables’ authority and refused to participate in collective chores.<sup>65</sup> The police chief in Tonkin reported that forty students from the Indo-Chinese University in Hanoi installed a youth camp in Tuong-Mai on 1 July 1942. They distributed medical care, discussed elementary notions of law, dispensed agricultural advice, and spread propaganda encouraging sport activities. One law student, Cunc-Dinh-Lo, began discussing the rehabilitation of political prisoners. The same student greeted French officials visiting the camp with a discourse “in which he let his nationalist feelings show.”<sup>66</sup> Duong Duc Hien, who had in the past associated with the Dai Viet Dan Chinh secret society, headed the Hanoi General Student Association; because of this background, Decoux opposed Duong Duc Hien’s nomination for leadership of this organization.<sup>67</sup> By September 1945, Ducoroy confessed that, despite the efforts of his commissariat to embrace the group, university youth “kept its distance, with a very developed nationalist leaning and critical spirit.”<sup>68</sup>

In 1946, colonial inspector J. de Raymond reported that the World War II sporting clubs also contained “bands of particularly active opponents.”<sup>69</sup> For example, one of the members of the administrative committee called the Society of Physical Education of Tonkin, Hoang Minh Giam, was previously a member of the Tonkin branch of the Socialist party (SFIO) and was thought to be collaborating with the Japanese.<sup>70</sup> The security service reported that Le Cuong, who specialized in publishing procommunist booklets, was working in the administrative committee of the Hanoi Swimming Club.<sup>71</sup>

Through French police reports from 1942 to 1944 for the area of Cochinchina, we are able to see the different repertoires of collective action that certain youth movements used to contest the Vichy project, including changing the wording of a play to include “tendentious comments” during an Easter performance, or frequently, to include anti-French song lyrics.<sup>72</sup> Police notified state authorities about the ongoing enthusiasm of students for local historical figures and topics “likely to flatter their patriotic feelings.”<sup>73</sup>

Hoang-Dao-Thuy, founder of the “Annamite Association of Scouting,” had expanded his influence over a greater number of youngsters in Tonkin with the unification of the scout movement into an Indo-Chinese Federation in 1937. The police feared that he taught his nationalist feelings to this youth. Already by August 1942, police in Tonkin called for stricter control of these youth movements, fearing that instead of spreading an “imperial spirit” they “rapidly evolved toward a pure nationalism.”<sup>74</sup> Official reports complained of the effects of “exaltations of nationalist feelings of young Indo-Chinese” lead-

ing to “untimely demonstrations” from some students and organizers of youth camps. Officials warned against the unauthorized singing of Vietnamese songs exalting indigenous historical heroes within youth organizations.<sup>75</sup> A communist tract printed in Vietnamese in 1941 and reprinted in January 1945 argued that in order to knock down imperial domination, the resistance must “send ‘partisans’ into the groups: scouts, catholic youth, etc. ... not to sap the foundation, but to breathe our spirit into it.”<sup>76</sup> The infiltration of such organizations was a vital tactic of anti-French elements.<sup>77</sup> In 1943, the permanent Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party resolved that party members must act within scout organizations. By 15 August 1945 the National Congress of the Indo-Chinese Communist Party resolved that one task of the Viet Minh was “to lead a propaganda campaign among young scouts.”<sup>78</sup> Adults involved in scouting also promoted anti-French ideology, while the teaching profession, which provided a pool of cadres for youth movements, also increasingly appeared to include nationalist elements. For instance, the police constantly watched scout leaders Pham Ngoc Thach and Ton Sua due to their well-known nationalist ideas.<sup>79</sup> In September 1945, Ducoroy concluded that the scout movement harbored Indo-Chinese leaders who could not hide their nationalist feelings.<sup>80</sup>

Indigenous priests, another youth leadership cadre, also included elements receptive to nationalist appeals. Their own agenda of independence from French priests, that is, their own desire to guide themselves as an independent Catholic community, partially explained their attraction to nationalist projects. The Catholic Youth corps in Nam-Dinh (Tonkin) had such an “anti-missionary attitude” that the church refused to recognize it. The Japanese also tried to recruit Vietnamese clergy in charge of youth. In the curacy of Xu-hoai (Annam), fifteen Vietnamese priests organized collections within youth organizations for the Vietnam National Restoration League (Viet-Nam-Phuc-Quoc-Dong-Minh-Hoi). This movement, created by the non-Marxist Prince Cuong De in Shanghai in 1939, had gathered a military unit by autumn 1940. Prince Cuong De was a member of the Nguyen royal house and an active opponent of French colonialism; he fled to Japan in 1905 and spent most of his life in exile.<sup>81</sup> The Russo-Japanese war provoked some Vietnamese intellectuals and Cuong De to look to Japan as the model to follow. By August 1943, the Vietnam National Restoration League and the pro-Japanese Dinh Khac Thiec, founder of the Vietnam Patriotic Youth Group, had contacted members of the general association of Indo-Chinese students to urge them to use youth movements as a space to propagate nationalist ideology.<sup>82</sup> Ducoroy believed that during the war, Christian youth corps were generally faithful to the regime, and the Buddhist youth showed sympathy toward the state enterprise, at least on the surface.<sup>83</sup>

One historian summarized the wartime tactics of the *Sûreté* in Vietnam as permitting nationalists and communists “to develop their activities up to a certain point, at the same time infiltrating them and registering all their

doings—and then launching a sudden destructive raid against the organization.”<sup>84</sup> Apart from the last step, the police adopted roughly the same tactic toward youth movements in Indochina. These corps attracted youth because they offered a recreational location and a legal means to assemble. Because they offered a social space for collecting youth, they also attracted those contestants of the regime who wanted to reach the largest numbers of potential recruits with their message of insurgency. In a double irony, the organizations, by acting as magnet for followers and leaders, indirectly served the regime’s stability interests by presenting to the police a network that was somewhat easier to monitor and control. Ducoroy’s youth service reminded youth leaders that there was a sizable number of young men who could become youth leaders because they had “the techniques, common sense, education and the habit of rough living.” And this policy was also valid “even for the ones who, obeying some other agenda, are thought of as opposition leaders.”<sup>85</sup> Frequent inspections of cadres by leaders of local services and other members of youth organizations, as well as the youth service’s close relation to the police department, did not prevent the state from losing control of some of these corps as time passed.<sup>86</sup> A Gaullist intelligence source reported in October 1945 that the majority of about 2,500 physical instructors trained by the French state-sponsored ESEPIC (Superior School of Physical Education of Indochina) had joined the Viet Minh.<sup>87</sup> In fact, “more Viet Minh company commanders were to graduate from the Pétainist youth corps than from all the Viet Minh cadres schools.”<sup>88</sup>

### **Conclusion: Transnationalism as Bringing the Colonial State to Locals, Rather Than the Inverse**

I have tried to demonstrate that three factors—consolidation, specialization, and response—are at the heart of transnational processes of patriotism and nationalism. More specifically, French state-sponsored youth activities led to the unwitting cultivation of indigenous nationalism. The ill-considered exaltation of the love of Indo-Chinese people for their colonial country caused youth movements to end up being networks where nationalist ideas could flourish with ease. The youth corps’ motto was: “United and Strong in Order to Serve.” Yet the motto was unfinished and therefore ambiguous. To serve whom? Which motherland? French officials’ promotion of local patriotisms was unwisely planned at a time when French prestige was declining. Even if indigenous public opinion in Indochina could not assume the end of French colonialism as the definite outcome of the World War, by 1943 more and more Vietnamese believed in “the notion of opportunity.” Many Vietnamese writers viewed World War II as an unusual time in which French power could be challenged, and these writers urged the Vietnamese to exploit this historical opportunity to liberate themselves.<sup>89</sup> Some youths and adults carried a peo-

ple's desire to become an independent nation inside the patriotic youth mobilization. Because youngsters learned to serve the motherland, they learned a repertoire of values and knowledge such as discipline, mutual help, and first aid that would be helpful later in the struggle for the building of independent Indo-Chinese nations.

Regarding consolidation, colonial officials tried to unify youngsters within a federal institution by promoting a relatively overarching patriotic ideology. This ideological discourse made a theoretical distinction between nationalism and patriotism. Patriotism was defined as the civic duties of subjects toward the colonial empire, whereas nationalism referred to a reciprocal process that encompassed not only citizens' civic duties toward the nation, but also their rights, often still to-be-created.<sup>90</sup>

However, the transfer of French patriotism to Indochina was not uniformly western but was grafted onto pre-existing cultural loyalties toward the king, Buddhism, and Confucianism. In this second stage of specialization, the Vichy regime presented different faces of an imagined community to various Indo-Chinese people. In Cambodia, the nation-building strategy based on constructing unity around the king carried into the 1950s, when King Sihanouk reconstructed the "Yuvan" youth corps as a tool for absolutist state-building.<sup>91</sup> For Laos, the state-building project centered around religion, and this political project has endured until today. Due to the key role of Theravada Buddhism in maintaining the culture and structure of society, various regimes after the Vichy period used Buddhism and monks for the purpose of political consolidation.<sup>92</sup> In Vietnam, the unintended consequence of these youth organizations was their evolution into a basis for indigenous nationalism and the quest for independence from colonial authority. Thus, local response is the third dimension of transnational patriotic mobilization. Native nationalists infiltrated some of these corps and mobilized part of the youth into movements for national liberation. Since some of the local population could interpret patriotism differently from the meaning that the propagators intended, such organizations served as a springboard toward national independence.<sup>93</sup> Patriotism did not always operate to defuse nationalism.

Looking at the case of the South American republics, Benedict Anderson stresses that they were administrative units from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, as was Asia in the mid-twentieth century. Each was a self-contained reality that served as a unit in the metropole's economic policy. Absolutist functionaries or administrators traveled to the core for schooling and training before returning to their provinces. This secular and statist "pilgrimage" created among these migrant creole communities an early form of nationalism that resulted from their animosity toward Europe. According to Anderson, these pilgrimages, combined with print-capitalism, shaped nationalism in the new world.<sup>94</sup>

In the Vietnamese case, nationalism was the result of educational models not only within but also outside of schools through youth organizations, and

clearly not the result merely of an imaginative exile of elites. It was rather grounded in local conflicts in the colony, resulting from a struggle for influence between the state propaganda of patriotic discipline and the message of national liberation propagated by nationalists infiltrating youth mobilizations. Anderson is right that some native elites had the opportunity to experience their nationality through exile, affirming Lord Acton's remark: "Exile is the nursery of nationality."<sup>95</sup> Indeed, he powerfully contrasts the roles of real and imagined circumstances in the building of one's nationality independent from an external power.<sup>96</sup> However, in the case of Indochina, the vast majority of the population never traveled abroad. The construction of their nationalism resulted from the contrast between everyday experiences, not the contrast between actual and imagined circumstances. Here, youngsters did not go to Paris: Paris came to them, through youth corps trying to teach them patriotic discourses and behaviors.

### Notes

1. Geoffrey C. Gunn, *Political Struggles in Laos, 1930-1945* (Bangkok: Duang Kamol, 1988), p. 99; Ellen J. Hammer, *The Struggle for Indochina, 1940-1955: Viet Nam and the French Experience* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954, 1966), p. 25. I would also like to thank Rodney Bohac, Dan Kryder, Herrick Chapman, and the *French Politics, Culture & Society* reviewer for their helpful suggestions.
2. Hammer, *The Struggle*, p. 32.
3. Télégramme # 783, Hanoi, 10 February 1944, agence FOM, box 272, file 451. Centre des Archives d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence (hereafter CAOM). At the time, this represented fifteen percent of the 4 million youth in Indochina (J. Sarlat, "Sports et Jeunesse où en sommes-nous?" *Indochine* 108 [24 September 1942], p. 2).
4. Huynh Kim Khanh, *Vietnamese Communism 1925-1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 26-34.
5. Jean Decoux, *À la barre de l'Indochine* (Paris: Plon, 1949), pp. 388-89. All translations from French to English are mine, unless otherwise noted.
6. John Breuilly, "Approaches to Nationalism," in *Mapping the Nation*, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan (London: Verso, 1996), p. 148.
7. There are different ways of defining a nation. A nation is described by Anderson as an imagined political community because it is not based on personal contact and is limited largely because there are boundaries that separate it from other nations. Finally, a nation is sovereign because it replaced the divine hierarchical dynasty (Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* [London: Verso, 1983], pp. 6-7). Other scholars also present the nation as socially constructed through a group that consciously shares a common culture; see, for example, Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Other nations, such as Germany, represent their nation ethnically, as based on a single language, origin, and culture, whereas France defines its nation

- politically, that is, through a common will to live together (Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nation in France and Germany* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982]; Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?* in *Oeuvres Complètes* [Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1947]).
8. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
  9. Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order* (New York: Norton, 1975); E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1870: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
  10. David Joel Steinberg, ed., *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 116; Milton Osborne, *Southeast Asia: An Introductory History* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1979). For a study of the relations between nationalist ideas and intellectuals, see Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism in Asia and Africa* (New York: New American Library, 1970).
  11. George Lefas (Ancien Aumonier Général de la F.I.A.S. [1938-1945]), "Note sur les origines du Scoutisme au Viet Nam," carton DH 400-1, Société des Missions Étrangères, Paris; Nguyen Van Khoan, "Huong Dao Sinh Viet Nam—Ho La Ai?" ("The Vietnamese Scouts—Who Are They?") *In the Past and Today*, Association of the Vietnamese Historians (May 1992), p. 17; *Éclaireurs d'Annam—Statuts: Règlement intérieur*, Hué: Dac-Lap, 1935, reference P 16528, National Library, Hanoi; David G. Marr, *Vietnamese Tradition on Trial 1920-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), p. 80. However, another source refers to short-lived scout troops in Hanoi in 1916: *Fédération Indochinoise des Associations du Scoutisme* (F.I.A.S.) (Saigon: Éditions de la Fédération Indochinoise de Scoutisme, 1939), reference P 21236, National Library, Hanoi.
  12. *Éclaireurs d'Annam*.
  13. Fernand Marsac, "Les progrès de l'éducation physique en Indochine," *Le Courrier Colonial*, 27 December 1935, agence FOM, box 244, file 332, CAOM.
  14. Guy de Larigaudie, *La Route aux Aventures Paris-Saigon en Automobile* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1939); Lefas, "Note sur les origines du Scoutisme au Viet Nam." When the "Youth of French Empire" emerged in Indochina in 1941, there were 5,460 male and female scouts, and there were 1,200 members included in other Catholic youth corps. A final important group was the Annamite Agricultural Youth, which claimed approximately 6,000 members. Report # 186-CGJ, Hanoi, 12 November 1941, Gouvernement Général d'Indochine (hereafter GGI), L8 444(41), p. 4, annex I, unindexed, CAOM; conseil fédéral indochinois, July 1942, GGI, reference 65296, CAOM.
  15. Claude Lange, "L'Église au Vietnam" (paper presented at the "Les prodromes de la décolonisation de l'empire français [1936-1956]" conference, Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent (CNRS), Paris, 4-5 October 1984), p. 13.
  16. Conseil fédéral indochinois 1941, rapport # 9: Jeunesse-sports, GGI, reference 65295, CAOM.
  17. *Indochine* 152 (29 July 1944), p. 13.
  18. Jean Vincent, "Rapport pour le Livre Vert," Phnom Penh, 26 June 1943, Résidence Supérieure du Cambodge (hereafter RSC), reference 676, CAOM; "Organisation de la Jeunesse," *Le Bulletin des Anciens Élèves de l'École Supérieure d'Éducation Physique de l'Indochine* 4 (September 1942), pp. 1-3.
  19. I borrow from Samuel the definition of patriotism as a "public service ethic" (Raphael Samuel, "Introduction: Exciting to Be English," in *Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity*, vol. 1, ed. Raphael Samuel [London and New York: Routledge, 1989], p. xxi).
  20. Quoted in *Voix d'Empire*, 26 November 1942, p. 1.
  21. Conseil Fédéral Indochinois, July 1942, GGI, reference 65296, CAOM.
  22. Télégramme # 7475, Hanoi, 1 December 1941, GGI, L8 454(41), unindexed, CAOM.



23. Lettre de Ducoroy à Decoux, Mhatrang, 5 January 1942, GGI, 183 11(42), undexed, CAOM. Emphasis in original.
24. Ibid.
25. "Les sports dans l'armée," *La Tribune Indochinoise*, 4 April 1942.
26. In fact, three *Tour d'Indochine* bike races took place between 1942 and 1944. Maurice Ducoroy, *Ma trahison en Indochine* (Paris: Éditions Inter-Nationales, 1949), p. 94.
27. "Tournée d'athlétisme au Laos," *Sports-Jeunesse d'Indochine* 11 (13 March 1942), p. 4.
28. Number 1054/CGSJ, lettre # 1054/CGSJ du Commissaire Général Sports-Jeunesse relative à la documentation sur l'Éducation Physique, les Sports et la formation morale de la jeunesse Indochinoise à M. le directeur des affaires politiques intérieures, Hanoi, 22 May 1942, in "Question d'éducation physique et de formation morale de la jeunesse indochinoise à la session de juillet 1942 du Conseil Fédéral indochinois," GGI, reference D.271F.30, # 1310, National Archives of Vietnam, Hanoi (hereafter VNNA).
29. G. C. Marteau, "La Course Monstre!" *Sports-Jeunesse d'Indochine*, Southern edition, 68 (25 November 1943), p. 5; Maurice Ducoroy, "Le Chef vous parle ....," *Sports-Jeunesse d'Indochine*, Southern edition, 71 (16 December 1943), p. 3.
30. E. J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); J. A. Mangan, *The Game Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an Ideal* (New York: Viking, 1985).
31. These facilities were no doubt not as substantial as modern day stadiums, although their exact design is unclear.
32. Ducoroy, *Ma trahison*, p. 103.
33. Hobsbawm and Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*, pp. 300-301.
34. On the use of emotional appeals by nation-builders see Mabel Berezin, "Political Belonging: Emotion, Nation, and Identity in Fascist Italy," in *State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn*, ed. George Steinmetz (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 335-77.
35. David P. Chandler, *A History of Cambodia* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), p. 190.
36. Chandler, *History of Cambodia*, p. 112. The Ramayana is a Sanskrit epic of India.
37. J. Desjardins, "À l'Ombre de la Révolution Maréchalienne, le Cambodge et sa Jeunesse," *Indochine* 207 (17 August 1944), p. 5.
38. "Rapport pour le Livre Vert," RSC, reference 676, CAOM.
39. Alfred McCoy, "French Colonialism in Laos, 1893-1945," in *Laos: War and Revolution*, eds. Alfred McCoy and Nina S. Adams (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 92-93; Gunn, *Political Struggles*, pp. 99-101; Decoux, *À la barre*, p. 409.
40. Hugh Toye, *Laos: Buffer State or Battleground* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 62.
41. Paul Lévy, *Histoire du Laos* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1974), p. 90.
42. "Simple présentation," *Lao Nhay*, January 1941, p. 4.
43. "Une Belle récompense," *Lao Nhay* 9 (15 June 1941).
44. Lowland Lao and Thai script were very similar also (Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 125). Regionalism sprung first from the partition of the Lan Xang kingdom in 1713; later, the French administratively separated the region of Luang Prabang from south and central Laos by imposing a protectorate on Luang Prabang while directly managing south and central Laos.
45. "Lao-Nhay à la fête de Phra Bat," *Le Nouveau Laos* 22 (25 January 1944).
46. "Fête des Eaux," *Lao Nhay* 16 (30 September 1941); "Vientiane," *Lao Nhay* 18 (31 October 1941), p. 6; "Les fêtes du That-Luang," *Lao Nhay* 19 (15 November 1941), p. 6.

47. For instance, the governor general visited the pagoda Sisakhet, where monks showed him the collection of antique Buddhas that had been hidden for their protection from Thai aggression during the Thai-French conflicts of December 1940–January 1941. In “La Semaine ... en Indochine,” *Indochine* 31 (3 April 1941), p. 10.
48. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 6.
49. Report # 186-CGJ, Hanoi, 12 November 1941, GGI, L8 444(41), p. 3, unindexed, CAOM.
50. “Nghé-An, le Commissaire Général aux Sports et à la Jeunesse chez les enfants bouddhistes,” *France-Annam*, 27 January 1943, p. 2; “Vinh, le Groupe des Enfants Bouddhistes en Annam,” *France-Annam*, 29 June 1943.
51. Francine Muel-Dreyfus, *Vichy et l'éternel féminin: Contribution à une sociologie politique de l'ordre des corps* (Paris: Seuil, 1996), pp. 281–82.
52. Rapport du capitaine de Vaisseau Ducoroy, in “pièces annexes,” Haut Commissariat d’Indochine (hereafter HCI), conspol 247, CAOM.
53. Osborne, *Southeast Asia*, pp. 113, 115. For instance, in 1942, the monk Hem Chieu was arrested in Phnom Penh for conspiring in an anti-French plot. His arrest provoked a demonstration organized by nationalists and supported by Japanese occupiers. On 20 July, more than a thousand people amassed, half of them monks, to demand Chieu’s release. The spokesmen were arrested. Perhaps the French wrongfully assumed that the king’s loyalty to the colonial power translated directly into the Cambodian sangha’s loyalty to the French. Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, pp. 168–69; Steinberg, *In Search of Southeast Asia*, p. 333.
54. George K. Tanham, “Nationalism and Revolution,” *Asia* 4 (Winter 1966), p. 36.
55. Marie Alexandrine Martin, *Cambodia: A Shattered Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 38.
56. Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, p. 166.
57. Rapport du capitaine de Vaisseau Ducoroy.
58. Note A/S de la situation politique du Laos, 17 November 1945, reference 80, in the “renseignements sur période libération” file, HIC, CAOM.
59. Nina S. Adams, “Patrons, Clients, and Revolutionaries: The Lao Search for Independence, 1945–1954,” in *Laos*, eds. McCoy and Adams, p. 105.
60. Stein Tønnesson, *The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945: Roosevelt, Ho Chi Minh and de Gaulle in a World at War* (London: Sage Publications, 1991), p. 46.
61. Interview with Vu Oanh, Hanoi, 10 June 1999; Vu Oanh, “Sur le mouvement révolutionnaire de la Jeunesse de Hanoi et des élèves du lycée du Protectorat (lycée Buoi—Chu Van An actuellement) pendant la révolution d’août 1945,” no date, 5 pages, translated from Vietnamese into French.
62. Number 900/CGSJ, le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Messieurs le Gouverneur de la Cochinchine, le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, en Annam, au Cambodge, au Laos, l’Administrateur en chef du Territoire du Kouang-Tcheou-Wan, Hanoi, 2 May 1942, in “Question d’éducation physique et de formation morale de la jeunesse indochinoise à la session de juillet 1942 du Conseil Fédéral indochinois,” GGI, reference D.271F.30, # 1310, VNNA. “Devillers saw the August Revolution as the ‘logical result of Viet Minh’s infiltration in all sectors of national life’” (Tønnesson, *Vietnamese Revolution*, p. 10).
63. Lettre # 1615-CGSJ de Jean Decoux, Hanoi, 4 September 1942, in “Organisation sportive et organisation de la jeunesse, 1942,” Mairie-Hanoi, reference 2891, VNNA.
64. “Sections de rassemblement,” *France-Annam*, 4 March 1943, p. 3.
65. “Rapport: Situation politique intérieure de l’Indochine de mars à septembre 1946,” in the “bilan situation politique” file, HCI, conspol 139, CAOM.
66. Note # 14543/S du Chef des services de police au Tonkin, Hanoi, 2 August 1942, in RST NF, reference 6237, CAOM.

67. Duong founded the Vietnam Democratic Party in 1944 and became minister of youth in the first Democratic Republic of Vietnam cabinet. Lettre # 49 de Decoux à M. le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, Hanoi, 6 February 1943, file "Association générale des Étudiants de l'Université Indochinoise (A.G.E.I.) 1935-1945," in "Associations des élèves et des étudiants de diverses écoles et facultés 1922-1945" RST, reference D.62 # 79.864, VNNA.
68. Rapport du capitaine de Vaisseau Ducoroy.
69. J. de Raymond, Note # 856/CP, Saigon, 22 February 1946, HCI, box 223, CAOM.
70. Service de la Sûreté au Tonkin au Résident Supérieur du Tonkin, Hanoi, 9 October 1941, in "observation du service de sûreté sur les membres des associations à Hanoi 1937-1944," Mairie-Hanoi, reference 2702, VNNA. In 1936, the Socialist party (SFIO) received the authorization to enroll Indo-Chinese members. Général Pechkoff, Tchong-King, 24 July 1944, p. 7 in the "L'agitation en faveur de Cuong De—les mouvements politico-religieux" file, HCI, conspol 192, CAOM.
71. Note # 795/S Service de la Sûreté au Tonkin à M. le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, Hanoi, 14 January 1943, in "observation du service de sûreté sur les membres des associations à Hanoi 1937-1944," Mairie-Hanoi, reference 2702, VNNA.
72. "Rapport mensuel sûreté intérieure 16 avril au 15 mai 1944"; "Rapport mensuel sûreté intérieure 16 décembre 1943 au 15 janvier 1944"; "Cochinchine rapport mensuel sûreté intérieure 16 novembre au 15 décembre 1943"; all in the "Cochinchine, rapport de la Sûreté" file, HCI, conspol 161, pp. 16-18, CAOM.
73. Note du Service de la police au Tonkin à M. le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin et à l'Intendant de police de l'Indochine, Hanoi, 20 November 1942, in "Fonctionnement de l'association générale des Étudiants de l'Université Indochinoise, 1936-1945," Mairie-Hanoi, reference 2902, VNNA.
74. Note # 14543/S du Chef de police des services du Tonkin, in RST NF, reference 6237, Hanoi, 2 August 1942, CAOM.
75. "Cochinchine rapport mensuel sûreté intérieure 16 juillet au 15 août 1943"; "Cochinchine rapport mensuel sûreté intérieure 16 juin au 15 juillet 1943," both in the "Cochinchine, rapport de la Sûreté" file, HCI, conspol 161, pp. 17-18, 21, CAOM.
76. Lettre au Révérend Père Moreau, Procureur des Missions Étrangères, 28 January 1946, file J, HIC, conspol 295, CAOM.
77. Note from Torel, 20 September 1945, box 240, file 1/E, HCI, p. 3, CAOM.
78. In 1935, during the first Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party, members offered a resolution on the subject of propaganda and youth, "the first time that a document of the party has broached 'the penetration of party authorities into youth organizations of the lower bourgeoisie ... especially 'the scout organization' to attract youngsters into the communist camp.'" Nguyen Van Khoan, "Huong Dao ...," p. 16.
79. "Cochinchine rapport mensuel sûreté intérieure 16 janvier au 15 février 1944"; "Cochinchine rapport mensuel sûreté intérieure 16 août au 15 septembre 1943"; "Cochinchine rapport mensuel sûreté intérieure 20 février au 19 mars 1943"; all in the "Cochinchine, rapport de la Sûreté" file, HCI, conspol 161, pp. 15, 18-19, CAOM.
80. Rapport du capitaine de Vaisseau Ducoroy.
81. "Note à l'attention de M. le Conseiller Politique, Saïgon, 31 December 1945, in the "Clergé Indochinois" file, HCI, conspol 125, p. 2, CAOM. Ralph B. Smith, "The Japanese Period in Indochina and the Coup of 9 March 1945," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 9, 2 (September 1978), p. 271.
82. Police # 7084S, "activités nationalistes," Saigon, 2 September 1943, p. 2. Envoi # 364-IPS, Intendance de police, "Note pour l'amiral, activités nationalistes en Cochinchine, Dalat, le 8 août 1943," Saigon, 1 September 1943, p. 3. Both in the

- "Agitations nationalistes en Cochinchine 1940-1944" file, HCI, conspol 207, CAOM.
83. Rapport du capitaine de Vaisseau Ducoroy.
  84. Tønnesson, *Vietnamese Revolution*, p. 104.
  85. Service de la Jeunesse au Commissariat Général à l'Éducation Physique, aux Sports et à la Jeunesse en Indochine, "Le Chef en face des autorités locales," *La Tribune Indochinoise*, 13 March 1942.
  86. Rapport du capitaine de Vaisseau Ducoroy.
  87. Direction des Études et Recherches (DGER), *Bulletin de Renseignements*, # 3316/25, 6, 3 (4 October 1945), cited in Vu Ngu Chieu, "Political and Social Change in Viet-Nam Between 1910 and 1946" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1984), p. 272, note 138.
  88. Bernard F. Fall, *The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis* (London: Pall Mall, 1967), p. 48, quoted in Sachiko Murakami, "Japan's Thrust into French Indochina 1940-1945" (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1981), p. 420.
  89. Pierre Brocheux, "La revue 'Thanh Nghi': un groupe d'intellectuels vietnamiens confrontés aux problèmes de leur nation (1941-1945)," *La Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 3 (April-June 1987), pp. 317-18.
  90. Nationalism would refer to what Liah Greenfeld identifies as a civic nationalism in which nationality equates citizenship in opposition to an ethnic nationalism which presents nationality as a cultural feature (*Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992]), quoted in Maurizio Viroli, *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 7-8.
  91. In Extrait du B.Q.R. # 366/RG du 15 janvier 1953 du Cambodge; Formation de la jeunesse, N.Q. 14 janvier 1953; Mouvement de jeunesse, formation militaire (cf. N.Q. # 14 du 17 janvier), janvier 1953; all in file F III 7, 10, HCI, SPCE 106, CAOM.
  92. See Martin Stuart-Fox and R. S. Bucknell, "The Politicization of the Buddhist Sangha in Laos," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 13,1 (1982): 60-80.
  93. Hugh Cunningham, "The Language of Patriotism," in Samuel, *Patriotism*, pp. 79, 81.
  94. "The interlock between particular educational and administrative pilgrimages (to various colonial capitals) provided the territorial base for new 'imagined communities' in which natives could come to see themselves as 'nationals'" (Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 140).
  95. Ho Chi Minh partially belongs to this group, spending thirty years of his life abroad. In 1911, he enlisted as a cook's helper on a French ship to learn about the outside world, the beginning of a 30-year exile.
  96. See Benedict Anderson, "Long-Distance Nationalism," *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World* (London: Verso, 1998), pp. 58-74.